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A REVIEW OF THE 1959 CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DECISIONS
By HAROLD HURST
Professor Hurst is Acting Dean of the University of Denver College
of Law.
The Colorado Supreme Court ground out nearly seventy de-
cisions during 1959 in which constitutional or administrative law
issues were raised. Both space and time make it impossible to re-
view all of the decisions. Omitted from this review are those cases
considered unimportant, those which most likely will be reviewed
elsewhere, and those which turn on minute points or raise issues
without merit.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Due Process of Law-Definiteness and Certainty
The Colorado Supreme Court had occasion, in two cases, to
consider whether Colorado statutes were void for want of sufficient
definiteness and certainty in the definitions and terms used to meet
the requirements of due process of law. The judicial test established
by the Supreme Court of the United States, in applying the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, requires that the
language of a state statute defining liability be plain enough that
men of ordinary intelligence need not guess at its meaning.1
The state statute prohibiting sale or use of fireworks2 was in
question in People v. Young.3 The sole question, thought the court,
was whether the law was so vague and indefinite as to render it
unconstitutional under Art. II, Sec. 25 of the Colorado Constitution
and the fourteenth amendment. After defining the term "fire-
works," the legislature attempted to exclude certain kinds of fire-
works in the following language:
The term 'fireworks' shall not include toy pistols, toy guns,
sparklers or torches which do not contain explosive charges
or other devices in which paper caps manufactured in ac-
cordance with United States interstate commerce commis-
sion regulations for packing and shipping of toy paper caps
are used and toy pistol paper caps manufactured as pro-
vided in this article.
4
The court sustained the statute as being sufficiently definite and
unambiguous that "no ordinary person could be misled."
The Colorado statute5 defining insanity as a defense in criminal
prosecutions was attacked as being so uncertain, ambiguous and
unintelligible as to constitute a deprivation of due process and equal
protection in Castro v. People.6 The defendant relied on Durham
v. United States7 which is said to hold that neither the right and
wrong test nor the irresistible impulse test supply adequate criteria
1 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. If 53-5-1, 53-5-2 (1953).
3 339 P.2d 672 (Colo. 1959).
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 53-5-1 (1953).
5 Cola. Rev. Stat. 1 39-8-1(2)(1953).
.6 346 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1959).
7 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.Cir. 1954).
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for determining criminal responsibility. It appears, on a careful
reading of the Castro case, that the court did not actually decide the
question raised, but held the matter to be one of policy and properly
left for legislative consideration.
Due Process-Adequacy of Notice
In two cases the Colorado Supreme Court stood between per-
sons and agencies of government to prevent impairments of prop-
erty rights without adequate notice of the proceeding. But in
another case it would appear that the court permitted-even order-
ed-impairment of private rights of persons not before the court.
The sufficiency of notice given by county commissioners of
deliberations leading to a rezoning ordinance was questioned in
Holly Development Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs.8 The no-
tice as published contained no reference to rezoning, erroneously
described the zone classification of the property to be rezoned, said
that the hearing would be at the "Court House" at a given day and
hour. Despite the fact that Holly Development knew about this
hearing, apparently understood its purpose, and actually appeared
and participated in the hearing, the court said that the notice was
insufficient, ambiguous and misleading, and unintelligible to the
average citizen who might be affected thereby. The failure to give
proper notice was thought to be dereliction in complying with man-
datory conditions precedent to the exercise of power.
In a probate proceeding one of the heirs obtained letters, an
order to publish notice, and, seemingly on the same day, a decree
of final settlement which cut off another heir who claimed a one-
half interest in the property of the estate. The aggrieved heir, learn-
ing of the situation some five and one-half years later, brought
action to set aside the final decree. The Colorado Supreme Court"
ruled that county courts sitting in probate matters have no more
authority to conduct proceedings without notice in disregard of due
process than do other courts or tribunals.
The court seems to have been caught napping in Lucas v. Dis-
trict Court.10 In Lucas, action had been brought to recover dam-
ages resulting from the alleged negligence of the defendant in an
auto accident. In pretrial discovery proceedings, plaintiff was tak-
ing the deposition of the defendant and asked whether defendant
had casualty insurance and, if so, the policy limits. Defendant ad-
mitted having such insurance but refused to answer as to policy
limits, obviously believing that the amount of insurance carried
had little to do with either liability or damages. A hearing was had
in the district court on the merits of the question whether defend-
ant should answer concerning policy limits and the question was
decided negatively in that court. The plaintiff sought mandamus
in an original proceeding in the Colorado Supreme Court for an
order directing the district court to order the defendant to answer
as to policy limits. The defendant was never notified or required
to appear to argue the question. One suspects that one of the in-
surance company counsel who appeared as amicus curiae represent-
ed the insuror of defendant, but the record is inconclusive. In any
8 342 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1959).
9 Michels v. Clemens, 342 P.2d 693 (Colo. 1959).
10 345 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1959).
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event, the Colorado Supreme Court, never noticing except in dis-
sent that the defendant was not represented in either brief or ar-
gument, decided that the defendant must disclose the limits of the
casualty insurance carried. Without further documentation of its
reasons for so deciding the numerous constitutional issues raised
by the briefs and oral arguments, the court simply said (on re-
hearing):
We have carefully examined the arguments and au-
thorities set forth in the briefs and have considered the oral
arguments of counsel which were offered at the hearing
which was extended to all of counsel, including amicus
curiae, and we are of the opinion that all of these conten-
tions are without merit. It seems doubtful to us in the
extreme that the Supreme Court of the United States would
conclude that this Court's construction of its own rule[
11]
constituted a violation of the provisions of the Constitution
of the United States.... 12
The court assumes that its construction of its own rule can not pos-
sibly be unconstitutional in its application!
In this case many constitutional issues were raised by counsel.
Some of them seemed to have merit. But Mr. Justice Hall noticed
the most fatal defect in the whole proceeding when he pointed out
that:
Now this court redetermines this identical question
'on its merits' and without having before it two of the par-
ties to the district court proceedings. Such determination
in my humble opinion is in violation of both federal and
state constitutional guaranties of due process and is there-
fore void for want of jurisdiction.
13
Mr. Justice Hall's point is well taken. The persons whose re-
sources were at stake in the case were the Moores. Their counsel
may well have had some good legal reasons why the plaintiff should
not have been permitted to inquire into the limits of their liability
policy equally cogent as those which would deny the plaintiff from
inquiring into how much property the Moores owned.
Arbitrary Interference With Property Rights
The Denver zoning ordinances of 1956 were struck down in
important parts as being in violation of due process of law, as being
abuses of police power, as being unreasonably discriminatory, or
as being retrospective in operation as applied to one of the parties. 4
The requirement that the owner of property in the B-6 district
provide large areas of off-street parking15 from which requirement
property in the adjoining B-5 district was exempt was declared to
be "unconstitutional when tested by the due process clause of the
11 Colo. R. Civ. P. 26(b) which provides, in pertinent part: " . . . the deponent may be examined
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action."
12 345 P.2d 1064, 1074 (Colo. 1959).13 Id. at 1080.14 Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 347 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1959).
15 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Ordinance, art. 614 (amend. 1959).
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state and federal constitutions and by Article II, Section 15, of the
State Constitution which provides, inter alia, that 'private property
shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without
just compensation.' 16 The court found that both B-5 and B-6 dis-
tricts were general business areas and that there was not sufficient
difference between them to warrant imposition of the burden of
off-street parking on one and exempt the other. Further, the court
could not find that requiring off-street parking had any relevancy
to the public health, safety and welfare. The latter reason for strik-
ing down the ordinance would probably prevent the imposition of
off-street parking requirements anywhere in the city.
Also declared to be invalid was the ordinance provision pro-
hibiting the extension of certain kinds of building uses declared
by the ordinance to be nonconforming.
17
The court further deemed the discrimination,18 between B-5
and B-6, as to the kinds of businesses permitted in each, size and
use of buildings, number of employees permitted, and other dis-
criminations, to be "unlawfully and unreasonably discriminatory."
Having already determined that the two areas were very similar in
nature, the court could see no reasonable basis for permitting the
operation of pawn shops and music studios in one and prohibiting
such uses in the other.
In Denver v. Greenspoon,19 the city created a sewer district
financed by special improvement assessments. The plaintiff owned
property which was incapable of being served by the sewer inas-
much as the sewer line was high on a bluff at the rear of plaintiff's
property. He brought action to have the assessment against his
property set aside. The court granted the relief requested, saying
that "To enforce a special assessment for a purpose which does not
confer a special benefit upon the property on which it is levied
would result in taking property without compensation, in violation
of due process of law.
-2 0
Delegation of Legislative Power
The extent to which the legislature may lawfully delegate its
authority was considered in four cases.
The Board of Regents of the University of Colorado is author-
ized to fix the charges for hospital services at Colorado General
Hospital "at a rate based upon the actual per diem expenses."
21
Upholding the formula, the court said, "That such is not a delega-
tion of legislative power, but rather the delegation of a power to
the Board to determine some fact, or state of things, upon which
the law as prescribed depends, appears beyond doubt.
'22
A Tri-County District Health Department was authorized by
law2 3 to make rules and regulations, violations of which were pun-
ishable as misdemeanors.24 A prosecution resulting in a conviction
for violation of one of the rules was reversed,25 the court ruling with
16 Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 347 P.2d 919, 923 (Colo. 1959).
17 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Ordinances, art. 617 (amend. 1959).
18 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Ordinances, art. 612 if .9-1 and .10 (amend. 1959).
19 344 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1959).
20 Id. at 681.21 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 124-4-6 (1953).
22 Bettcher v. Colorado, 344 P.2d 969 (Colo. 1959).
23 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 66-2-7(4)(1953).
24 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 66-2-14 (1953).
25 Casey v. People, 336 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1959).
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very little discussion that the legislature had unlawfully delegated
its power contrary to the Colorado Constitution, Art. III.
In another case,2 6 the defendant was convicted of violating a
land use ordinance adopted by the voters in a soil conservation
district. The state statute27 attempted to authorize the adoption of
such ordinances by three-fourths of the voters voting in the district.
Violations of the ordinances were misdemeanors. Because the
statute left the determination of what acts would be punishable to
the voters, the court declared the statute to be an unlawful dele-
gation of power.
In an attempt to restore somewhat the pre-Merris status quo,
the legislature enacted a statute28 which would have given munici-
palities power to make and enforce ordinances imposing criminal
penalties for conduct of both local and statewide import, even
though the subject matter was covered by state law. Prosecution
under a municipal ordinance would have barred a prosecution for
the same offense under the state law, and vice versa. The Governor
requested an advisory opinion from the Colorado Supreme Court
which held 29 the law to be an unlawful delegation of legislative
power to cities, and that the law would authorize the adoption of
special and local laws in violation of the Colorado. Constitution,
Art. V, Sec. 25.
Municipal Ordinances v. State Statutes
In the wake of the Merris decision 30 have followed numerous
cases in which the courts have had to wrestle with the distinction
between matters of local concern and matters of state-wide concern
in order to decide upon the enforceability of municipal ordinances.
Merris held that drunken driving of a motor vehicle was of general
state-wide concern and that a state statute punishing drunken driv-
ing precluded municipalities from prosecuting under local ordi-
nances. The problem which is creating the greatest difficulty seems
to be whether home-rule cities may by ordinance punish for conduct
which is of general state-wide concern, but which is also somewhere
between a little bit and a great deal of local concern.
It was noted above that the Colorado Supreme Court unani-
mously struck down Senate Bill 72, passed by the Forty-ninth Gen-
eral Assembly, which would have authorized cities to enact and
enforce ordinances concerning matters which were at the same time
of both local and state-wide interest. The reason given was that
Art. V, Sec. 25 of the Colorado Constitution prohibits the legislature
from enacting local or special laws when a general law will do.
And otherwise, the legislature is prohibited from delegating its
power to enact general laws. Three recent decisions handed down
last year serve to illustrate the confusion brought about by Merris,
and also seem to indicate that what the legislature was told it could
not do in Senate Bill 72 without a constitutional amendment is,
nevertheless, being permitted with the sanction of judicial legisla-
tion.
26 Olinger Y. People, 344 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1959).
27 Colo. Rev. Stat. If 128-1-9, 128-1-14 (1953).
28 Senate Bill 72, Forty-ninth General Assembly.
29 In re Senate Bill 72, 339 P.2d 501 (Colo. 1959).
30 Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
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The three cases all arose in Denver and consequently involve
the special authority given home-rule cities by Article XX of the
Colorado Constitution to legislate upon any subject of local concern
with the same power as might otherwise be exercised by the
legislature.
Davis v. Denver31 held that Denver could not enforce an
ordinance prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle by one whose
driver's license is suspended or revoked. In its opinion, the Colorado
Supreme Court said:
32
... Article XX of the Constitution does not grant to the
City authority to regulate matters of general and state-wide
concern and, as indicated above, this power can be exercised
by municipalities only if the State consents to its exercise
and provided that the matter, although predominantly
general, is one in which the municipality has sufficient
interest to warrant the delegation of power to it ....
A specially concurring opinion agrees with the result reached
by the majority in this case but sees trouble ahead by virtue of the
majority's finding power in the legislature to consent to local
legislation on matters predominantly of state-wide concern.
Denver was also denied power to prohibit driving a motor
vehicle while the driver's license was revoked, in Denver v. Palm-
er.33 In its opinion, the court said that the offense of driving while
the operator's license is suspended or revoked is a matter of general
state-wide importance and concern and, therefore, any attempt by
the city to legislate on this subject is ultra vires and void. Note the
absence in this case of the use of the term "predominantly of state-
wide concern."
In a third case,3 4 Denver claimed authority to regulate speed on
the Valley Highway, a limited access four- and six-lane non-stop
arterial highway traversing the city, connecting at both ends with
state highways, and carrying both local and through traffic. The
court sustained Denver's power to regulate speed, although as-
serting that the predominant interest was that of the state. The
opinion then asserts that the "right of the City to regulate speed
had been in fact recognized by the State by allowing the City to post
the highway and enforce its ordinances. The City, acting with the
consent and approval of the State, had the requisite jurisdiction in
the premises .... -35 There is here an apparent and substantial con-
flict with In Re Senate Bill 7236 concerning the validity of state per-
mission to cities to regulate matters predominantly of state-wide
concern.
Other Cases
The so-called severance tax enacted in 195337 imposing a gradu-
ated tax upon gross income derived from the production or extrac-
tion of crude oil and natural gas was contested by The California
Company38 as being unconstitutional for a number of reasons. The
31 342 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1959).
32 Id. at 677.
33 342 P.2d 687 (Colo. 1959).
34 Denver v. Pike, 342 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1959).
35 Id. at 687 (Emphasis supplied).
36 In re Senate Bill 72, 339 P.2d 501 (Colo. 1959).
37 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 138-1-7 (1953).
38 Calif. Co. v. Colorado, 348 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1959).
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company contended that the tax was repugant to the due process
and equal protection requirements of the state and federal consti-
tutions; that the tax is not an income tax but rather a property tax
and as such violates the state constitutional provisions requiring
uniformity 39 and limiting the rate of the levy; 40 and that the tax
unduly burdened interstate commerce and was therefore repugnant
to the federal constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court held that
the tax was an excise tax, and not a property tax. Laboring the
point long, the court finally concluded that the progression in the
tax rate in relation to gross income was not arbitrary and therefore
did not transgress equal protection and due process. The court dis-
posed of the objection on interstate commerce grounds by holding
that the tax fell upon income from an intrastate operation, the ex-
traction of oil and gas, before the oil and gas ever entered interstate
commerce.
An important decision 41 in the field of labor-management rela-
tions considered the question whether the Colorado state courts
could enjoin a labor union from picketing where the object was to
coerce the employer to operate a closed shop, conduct which is
defined as an unfair labor practice by the Colorado Labor Peace
Act.42 The same conduct is defined as an unfair labor practice in
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.43 Further, the federal act gives the
National Labor Relations Board exclusive power to enforce Taft-
Hartley and provides that the board may cede its power to an
agency of the state.4 It is elementary and needs no citation that
federal power over labor management relations is predicated on the
effect of such relations upon interstate commerce. Nowhere in the
opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court is there an explanation why
the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant should be
considered as affecting interstate commerce. The court's decision
that the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB over the matter ousted
the jurisdiction of the state court seems to be consistent with many
cases cited in the opinion-assuming that interstate commerce was
involved. But the United States Supreme Court has sustained many
injunctions entered by state courts to restrain unfair labor practices
in controversies not affecting interstate commerce.45
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Again, as in prior years, the administrative law cases reflect the
propensity of certain of the administrative agencies to be arbitrary
and capricious in the decision of cases before them and to fail in
making a record and findings sufficient for judicial review.
Decisions Contrary to the Evidence
As a practical matter, there would be little point in holding
hearings and taking evidence if decisions are not based upon evi-
dence. As a matter of constitutional right, a person whose liberty or
property is to be affected by a hearing is entitled to a finding and
39 Colo. Const. art. X 1 3.
40 Colo. Const. art. X I 11, limiting the state property tax levy to 4 mills on each $1 of valuation.
41 Building Constr. Trades Council v. American Builders, Inc., 337 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1959).
42 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 80-5-6 (1953).
43 29 U.S.C. §1 157-58 (1956).
44 29 U.S.C. 1 160 (1956).
45 See, e.g., Local Union No. 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 585 (1953); International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
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decision in accordance with the evidence.4 6 During 1959, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court reversed the decisions of administrative agen-
cies in at least four cases because the court deemed agency action
to be arbitrary and capricious in that the decision in each case was
clearly contrary to the evidence.
47
Necessity for Record and Findings
In three cases the Supreme Court reversed and remanded agency
actions because the agency had not made any record of the pro-
ceedings or evidence, making it impossible for the court to deter-
mine whether the decision was in accord with the evidence.4 8
Typical language to be found in the court's opinions reversing
and remanding such cases is the following from Colorado Banking
Board v. Finnigan4 9 in which the agency action was sent back "with
directions to the trial court to remand the matter to the Board...
for hearing in the plaintiff's application and the taking and record-
ing of all testimony, exhibits, and other evidence in support of the
application ... for the making of specific findings of fact as the basis
of an order granting or denying the license applied for."50
Variance Between Charge and Findings
Just as the finding must be in accord with the evidence, so
must the finding be consistent with the charge. In State Civil Serv-
ice Commission v. Conklin,51 the defendant, Commander of the
Soldiers and Sailors Home, was charged, in a complaint to the Civil
Service Commission, with negligent and wilful failure to control
fiscal matters, use of heavy-handed methods, failure to keep a physi-
cal inventory, refusal to cooperate with the governing board, in-
subordination, lack of capacity to prepare and supervise a budget,
lack of administrative ability, incompetent supervision of a boiler
installation, and failure to make proper inspections and reports. The
Civil Service Commission held a hearing on the complaint and en-
tered its findings and order, reciting that it found a "complete
breakdown and loss of confidence between the Board of Commis-
sioners . . . and the present Commander . . .has irritated members
of the Board of Commissioners .. The court held, therefore,
that Conklin should be removed.
The Supreme Court, on review, said, "The Commission made no
specific findings with reference to any of the seven charges pre-
ferred against Conklin .... it was improper to find him guilty of
shortcomings of which he was not charged . . . ,,53 The removal or-
der of the Civil Service Commission was vacated.
46 See Western & A. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
47 Colorado Transp. Co. v. P.U.C., 347 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1959); McNertney v. State Bd. of Examiners
of Architects, 342 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1959); Board of County Comm'rs v. Skoff, 340 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1959);
Buddy & Lloyd's Store No. 1, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 337 P.2d 389 (Colo. 1959).
48 Neverdahl v. Linder, 347 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1959); Buddy & Lloyd's, supra note 47; Colorado
Banking Bd. v. Finnigan, 336 P.2d 98 (Colo. 1959).
49 336 P.2d 98 (Colo. 1959).
50 Id. at 100 (Emphasis supplied).
51 138 Colo. 528, 335 P.2d 537 (1959).
52 Id. at 531-32. 335 P.2d at 538-39.
53 Id. at 533, 335 P.2d at 539-40.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF PROPERTY
By RICHARD L. EASON
Member of the Denver firm of Dawson, Nagel, Sherman
and Howard
In 1959 the Colorado Supreme Court decided approximately 36
cases involving various phases of general property law. The most
significant cases involved oil and gas and water law.
Oil and Gas
The Supreme Court denied rehearing in the case of Corlett v.
Cox' in which the owner of the fee had conveyed by warranty deed
containing the following reservation: "It is, however, further
agreed and distinctly understood that Carl A. Holcomb hereby re-
serves 61/4% of all gas, oil and minerals that may be produced on
any or all the above mentioned land, or in other words reserves
of the usual 1/8 royalty .... -"2 There was no oil and gas lease out-
standing against the land at the time of the conveyance. The dis-
trict court of Weld County held that the grantor had reserved a
1/16 interest in the mineral fee estate. Plaintiffs-in-error contend-
ed that the above words reserved a perpetual non-participating roy-
alty interest of 61/4%. The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of
the trial court. It directed attention to a 1954 oil and gas lease
wherein both plaintiffs and defendants had joined as lessors and
felt the parties had treated the interest reserved as a 1/16 mineral
interest. The court also laid emphasis on the fact that here was no
oil and gas lease in exisence at the time of the reservation. In quot-
ing from an Oklahoma case3 it said: "There was at the time of the
conveyance . . . no oil and gas lease upon the property and in a
strict sense there were no royalty rights to reserve or deal with in
any manner.
'4
In the Corlett case the Supreme Court affirmed Simpson v. Lang-
holf,5 which was theretofore considered a questionable case, and in
effect held that no perpetual non-participating royalty interest can
be created where there is no existing oil and gas lease on the prem-
ises at the time of the attempted creation. Thus, the words of Lord
Coke quoted in the Simpson case:
If a man seized of land in fee by his deed granteth to oth-
ers the profits of those lands to have and to hold to him
and his heirs and maketh livery, sucundum, forman, char-
tae the whole land itself doeth pass. For what is the land
but the profits thereof?6
seem to have application today notwithstanding modern-day prop-
erty concepts applied and relied upon in the oil and gas industry.
A confusing case was Radke v. Union Pac. R.R.,T in which an
action was brought by owners of certain Logan County land to re-
1 138 Colo. 325, 333 P.2d 619 (1959).
2 Id. at 327, 333 P.2d at 620.
3 Pease v. Dolezal, 206 Okla. 696, 246 P.2d 757 (1952).
4 138 Colo. at 332, 333 P.2d at 622.
5 133 Colo. 208, 293 P.2d 302 (1956).
6 Id. at 214, 293 P.2d at 306.
7 138 Colo. 189, 334 P.2d 1077 (1958).
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move a cloud from their title alleged to exist by reason of the fol-
lowing reservation contained in a deed to plaintiffs' predecessors:
Reserving, however, to the said Union Pacific Railway
Company the exclusive right to prospect for coal and other
minerals within and underlying said land and to mine for
and remove the same if found, and for this purpose it shall
have right-of-way over and across said lands and space
necessary for the conduct of said business thereon, with-
out charge or liability for damage therefor.
8
The court held that the quoted language created a mere license
subject to revocation before its exercise by the railroad rather than
a mineral reservation or exception from the grant. The court fur-
ther held that because it was a mere license, and subject to revoca-
tion by the owner of the fee, revocation followed ipso facto by the
conveyance of the land by the fee owner to a third party. It was
further held that the license in the instant case was not an interest
in property, such as an incorporeal hereditament, but that it was
something separate and distinct from an interest in property, being
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlaw-
ful. The court alluded to the fact that some types of licenses were
irrevocable (those coupled with a grant in presentae and those
coupled with an interest) but went on to hold that the license in the
instant case was neither coupled with a grant nor coupled with an
interest, and thus revocable prior to being exercised. The court
stated that in order to create a severance of the mineral estate such
as was recognized in Mitchell v. Espinoza,9 the severance must be
by clear and distinct wording in the conveyance. The Radke case
cannot be considered as an important precedent because it must of
necessity be limited to the language contained and used in the spe-
cific form of reservation in question. It does contain interesting
language with respect to the nature and definition of licenses and
to the necessity of precise draftmanship in creating or reserving
mineral interests.
In Farnik v. Board of County Comm'rs,10 the plaintiff had ac-
quired property from the county, which in turn had acquired title
by treasurer's deed. In its pre-1949 deed, the county had reserved
minerals. Both the plaintiff and the county had executed oil and
gas leases. Plaintiff sought to quiet title against the outstanding
mineral interest of the county on the basis that the county had no
authority to reserve minerals, in that its powers and duties in ac-
quiring and disposing of real property for non-payment of taxes are
defined by the revenue statutes" rather than the general laws de-
fining powers of boards of county commissioners. Without ruling
on the power of counties to reserve minerals before 1949, the court
held that the 1949 Session Laws12 validated and confirmed previous
reservations of minerals and oil and gas leases issued by counties
thereunder. The court held that the validating act applied to min-
erals acquired by counties by tax foreclosure, but went on to hold
that county authority was only to purchase and hold real property
8 Id. at 195-96, 334 P.2d at 1081.
9 125 Colo. 267, 243 P.2d 412 (1952).
10 341 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1959).
11 Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 36, art. 11 (1953).
12 Co. Sess. Laws 1949, Ch. 140.
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for county use and that no power was granted to hold reserved
minerals for purposes of speculation. Thus counties have no power
to retain reserved minerals where a county purpose or use no long-
er exists and reserved minerals must be sold and reinstated to the
tax rolls as soon as possible after reservation.
In the case of Clovis v. Pacific N.W. Pipeline Co.,l3 plaintiff had
executed an oil and gas lease involving 632 acres of land to de-
fendant's predecessors. The lease contained no voluntary pooling
or unitization clause. The defendant drilled a producing well in the
north half of section seven in which the plaintiff owned fifty-two
acres, but the well was not drilled on plaintiff's land. After com-
mencement of the well, the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
ordered the north half of section seven pooled. Later the defendant
drilled a producing well in the south half of section six. This well
was drilled on plaintiff's land and the south half of section six was
likewise pooled by order of the Commission. The defendant ceased
paying delay rentals on leased lands not within the pooled units and
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment as to whether the produc-
ing wells within the two pooled units validated defendant's lease
as to land outside the units. The court held that the drilling of a
producing well within a unit validates the outside acreage con-
tained within the same lease whether the well is on leased lands or
not, and further that the lessor is protected as to non-unitized lands
by the application of implied covenants for reasonable development
and protection against drainage and that such covenants existed in-
dependent of the primary term.
Water Rights
In Cresson Consolidated Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Whit-
ten,'1 4 the owners of adjudicated water rights on a stream sought to
enjoin two mining companies from impounding water, which the
companies claimed to have developed by driving lateral tunnels. It
was alleged by the plaintiffs that the water, if released, would flow
through the main tunnel into the stream in which their rights had
been adjudicated. The plaintiffs asserted that the water was tribu-
tary to the stream and the mining companies claimed that the wa-
ter was developed water and thus not tributary. The trial court
granted the injunction against the impounding of the water with-
13 345 P.2d 729 (Colo. 1959).
14 338 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1959).
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out allowing the mining companies to adduce evidence that the
water was in fact developed and not tributary. In so doing the trial
court held that it would consider no evidence as to rights of owner-
ship other than rights that had been adjudicated. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the refusal by the trial court to con-
sider evidence of ownership other than adjudicated priorities was
error in that adjudication was not necessary to the acquisition of
rights. The court stated that, "An adjudication only confirms that
which has already been accomplished.' 1 5 The court further stated
that the mining companies were entitled to prove their rights even
though not previously adjudicated and failure to allow proof was
a denial of due process. The court went on to restate the rule that
all waters are presumed tributary but held that the mining com-
panies were entitled to adduce proof to overcome this presumption.
On June 22, 1959, the Supreme Court decided the much pub-
licized South Platte Water Conservancy District case.16 In this case
originating petitions were filed under the Water Conservancy Act 17
with the District Court of Weld County for the creation of a water
conservancy district of designated boundaries and for stated pur-
poses. Protesting petitions and objections were filed but later dis-
missed by the trial court after hearing. At the hearing on the suf-
ficiency of the originating petitions, before any evidence was taken,
counsel for petitioners moved to amend the originating petitions to
exclude lands of objectors from the district. The trial court granted
the motion to amend, thereby excluding the lands of objectors and
protestants from the proposed district. Subsequently, an original
proceeding in the nature of quo warranto was instituted in the
Supreme Court by the attorney general to test the legality of the
formation of the district and the rights of its directors to hold office.
The court held that it could review the entire record of the pro-
ceedings before the trial court in the quo warranto proceedings, and
that the record to be searched included testimony and all matters
considered by the trial court. Reviewing the record, the court held
that the trial court erred in granting petitioners' motion to amend,
as the statute gave the court power to allow amendments to correct"errors in the description of the territory" ' only, and that petition-
ers motion was patently not for this purpose. The court held further
that in allowing petitioners' motion to exclude the properties of
objectors the trial court violated the rights of the original signa-
tories to the petitions, in that after the exclusion the petitions no
longer described the "territories to be included in the proposed
district" as required by statute. The court stated that it could not
be assumed that any one of the petitioners would have signed had
he known that the district to be created would be substantially
different from that represented to him by the instrument which
he had signed. The court further held that the Water Conservancy
Act did not give the trial court jurisdiction to determine what dis-
trict is desirable or in the public interest but rather limited the
trial court's function to supervising strict compliance with the
statutory procedure.
15 Id. at 283.
16 People ex rtel. Dunbar v. South Platte Water Conservancy Dist., 343 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1959).
17 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 149-6-41 (1953).
18 343 P.2d at 818.
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In the case of Saunders v. Spina,19 plaintiffs and defendants
were users of water from the same ditch. Plaintiffs brought an
action to enjoin defendants from interfering with their asserted
rights to use water in the ditch and for damages. Plaintiffs claimed
one half interest in all the water allocated to the ditch by virtue of
an 1890 ditch decree. The court reaffirmed the rule that a decree
entered in a ditch adjudication is not determinative of ownership
of various water priorities as between users, stating, "A ditch de-
cree merely awards the ditch its proper number and adjudicates
the amount of water to which it is entitled from water priorities
which will use it."'20 The court further held that the burden was
upon the plaintiffs to show either a better record title than defend-
ants or that defendants had abandoned or waived prior rights to
which defendants had proved title. The court held that such burden
was not sustained and that abandonment is not to be presumed,
stating, "Nor shall the owner of the right be held to have surrender-
ed it or merged it except on reasonably clear and satisfactory evi-
dence."
21
In the case of Nesbitt v. Jones,22 the plaintiff sued to quiet title
to seventy-five inches of water allegedly conveyed to plaintiff's
predecessors in 1879. In 1928 plaintiff's predecessor exchanged
another 150-inch water right to the canal company for shares of
stock in said company. The court held that the 75-inch right was
lost to the canal company by adverse use, holding that the use of
the seventy-five inches became adverse in 1928 when other rights
were exchanged for shares in the company. The court stated, "The
entire purpose of this transaction was to transform the previous
relationship from one of priority so to speak . . .to a relationship
of tenancy in common whereby the Post farm would share with
the other canal company stockholders . . . ",23 The court held that
the transaction served to notify plaintiff that the company recog-
nized no other or further right and that such notification trans-
formed a previous permissive use to an adverse use which had
continued for the statutory period.
Mechanic's Liens
Hayutin v. Gibbons24 was a case in which a materialman, sued
the owner of property (in which the materials were incorporated in
improvements) for the value of materials furnished. The owner
defended on the ground that he had entered into a statutory con-
tract with the contractor and that the same had been recorded ac-
cording to law. The court held that though the recording of the
statutory contract may limit the extent to which the owner's prop-
erty may be subject to liens it does not limit personal liability for
goods furnished. The court stated that the Mechanic's Lien Act 25
does not extend an exclusive remedy to claimants but merely af-
fords statutory lien rights and when, as here, the materialman was
able to prove a personal promise on the part of the owner or his
19 344 P.2d 469 (Colo. 1959).
20 Id. at 473.
21 Id. at 474.
22 344 P.2d 949 (Colo. 1959).
23 Id. at 955.
24 338 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1959).
25 Colo. Rev. Stat. 9 86-3-1 (1953).
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agent to pay for materials furnished he could recover the value
thereof.
In the case of Sontag v. Abbott,26 the holders of mechanic's
liens for labor and material sought to foreclose their liens, naming
as a party defendant a purchase money mortgagee. It appeared
that the holder of an option to purchase the property ordered ma-
terials which were delivered to the premises the day prior to the
delivery of the warranty deed to him. The trial court held that
the mechanic's liens were superior to the purchase money deed of
trust as they related back to the date of commencement of work
(which was held in this case to be the date materials were first
delivered to the premises), which was prior to the recording of the
purchase money deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed the
holding of the trial court that the optionee who caused delivery of
the building materials to the premises, and whose rights later
ripened into fee ownership, was an "owner" for purposes of the
Mechanic's Lien Act with power to charge the property with a lien.
The court further held that the delivery of materials was the "com-
mencement of work" under the statute to which priority of liens
related, (citing International Trust Co. v. Clark Hardware Co.2 7)
and since the materials were delivered to the premises prior to
recording of the deed of trust the mechanic's liens were superior.
The court further held that the fact that the deed of trust secured
a purchase money loan did not entitle it to any preference in that
the statute provided that mechanic's liens "shall have priority over
26 344 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1959).
27 66 Colo. 210, 180 Pac. 579 (1919).
'?YEMATR9RDj/OOoS Co.
al- t. ISs , . G I ~ .
KUPPENHEIMER
MID-WEIGHT SUITS
... tailored with traditional Kuppenheimer
distinction . . . of superb quality wool . . .
are an excellent choice for three seasons
of the year. Soft tempo colorings with un-
usual richness of pattern work . . . in gray
and brow n m ixtures .......... ..............- 95.00
Exclusive with us in Denver
Men's Shop, all 3 stores
DICTA
MARCH-APRIL 1960
any and every lien or encumbrance subsequently intervening. ' 8
The court stated that had the legislature intended to make an ex-
ception of purchase money mortgages it would have so provided.
Mining Law
In McNulty v. Kelly29 an action was brought challenging de-
fendant's title to certain placer mining claims by the locators of
overlapping claims. The defendant's claims were prior in time but
plaintiff alleged that they were invalid because located as if on
publicly surveyed land. The defendant's location certificates de-
scribed the property located "by legal subdivisions of public land
survey" when in fact the land had not been surveyed by the federal
government. The court found the descriptions contained in defend-
ant's location certificates sufficient where a reasonable man, by
using the description and other evidence, could determine the loca-
tion involved. The court held that the description need not assume
the formality required to prove title for patent purposes and that
location certificates may contain a description of the land by section
numbers not based on an official United States Government survey.
The court further held it to be a question of fact whether the loca-
tion certificate adequately described the claim, and that the trial
court in the instant case had before it sufficient evidence to prove
that the claim could be located from the description set forth in
the certificate.
Landlord and Tenant
The case of Hix v. Roy 3" added little to the law of landlord and
tenant but is worthy of mention here if only to indicate that the
statutory prerequisites to actions under the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Statute3 1 will be strictly applied. The landlord, one of
two co-lessors, brought an FED action to evict the tenant. It appears
that a notice was sent to the tenant stating that if certain conditions
were not met and correction made the landlord would exercise the
right to terminate the lease. The court held that such a notice was
deficient and did not comply with the requirements of the statute
in that it was conditional and did not unequivocally terminate the
lease pursuant to the terms thereof. The court said, "A notice to
terminate a lease generally to be effective must be unequivocal and
unconditional and must be such as to be fully understood by the
recipient."" The court further held that the failure of the co-lessor
to join in the notice and attempted termination of the lease render-
ed the notice defective; that in the absence of agency (which is not
presumed and must be established), one tenant in common cannot
give notice for all without consent. Thus the notice on its face
could only be effective, if at all, as to the tenant in common so
acting.
GENERAL REAL PROPERTY
In the case of Smith v. Town of Fowler,"3 the town brought an
action to quiet title to "Lot 1, north of the river in Section 16 ......
28 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 86-3-6 (1953).
29 346 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1959).
30 340 P.2d 438 (Colo. 1959).
31 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 58-1-1 (1953).
32 Ibid. at 440.
33 138 Colo. 359, 333 P.2d 1034 (1959).
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The defendants, owners of adjoining land, answered and claimed
title for themselves. It appeared that an 1870 government survey
had established the meander line of the southerly bank of the Ar-
kansas River and had platted lands to the south thereof. It further
appeared that a subsequent government survey had platted lands
north of the meander line established by the 1870 government sur-
vey. The patent to the lot in question described the land as "North
of Arkansas River . . . according to the official plat of the survey
of said lands returned to the General Land Office. . . ." The official
survey showed the south boundary of Lot 1 as being the meander
line as established. It appeared that Lot 1 was actually south of the
Arkansas River and the defendants thus claimed title on two
grounds, accretion and adverse possession. The defendants claimed
that the north boundary of their property (the south boundary of
Lot 1) was the thread line of the Arkansas River as the same existed
and as the river had moved north Lot 1 had been absorbed by ac-
cretion and therefore belonged to defendants.
The court cited Hanlon v. Hobson3 4 for the general rule, where-
in the court stated, "[W]here, as here, in a deed conveying lands
an unnavigable river itself is named as a monument, the grant
extends to its center and the thread of the stream is its true boun-
dary.' '35 The court noted the further rule that the owner of lands
bounded upon an unnavigable stream is benefited or his holdings
impaired by changes in the course of the stream occurring gradu-
ally over a period of time. The court held, however, that an excep-
tion to the general rule existed where the parties to the conveyance
intended otherwise, and held that the wording "according to the
official plat thereof" in the United States patent to the lot in ques-
tion referred to the official government survey of the meander line
which was intended to be the south boundary of Lot 1. The court
found sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court's finding that
the meander line was intended to be used as a boundary and held
that where the meander line is intended to be so used accretion
cannot come into being. The court dismissed the adverse possession
claim of defendants, holding that the mere pasturage of cattle on
unfenced land cannot be regarded as hostile or adverse.
In the case of Western Motor Rebuilders, Inc. v. Carlson,36 the
plaintiffs conveyed lots to defendant "subject to the protective
covenants as shown on the official plat thereof on file in the office
34 24 Colo. 284, 51 Pa. 433 (1897).
35 Id. at 288, 51 Pat. at 435.
36 138 Colo. 404, 335 P.2d 272 (1959).
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of the Clerk and Recorder of Grand County, Colorado."37 The
plaintiffs claimed a violation of the protective covenants by defend-
ant and asked the court for an injunction, damages and for a decree
declaring forfeiture of title. 'The defendant asserted that it had
purchased the property prior to the establishment of protective
covenants, and that further the plaintiffs' action was barred by
laches, estoppel and waiver. The Supreme Court reversed judgment
of the trial court awarding the injunction, holding that where the
defendant had paid the full purchase price for the lots and has been
given possession thereof he had acquired the entire equitable title
and thereafter the plaintiffs held only a bare, naked legal title in
trust for the defendant. Thus, the plaintiffs could not impose re-
strictive covenants on the land without the defendant's consent.
The court stated that the plaintiffs had actually, though unknow-
ingly, performed "livery of seisin" in that the parties went upon
the land to be conveyed and observed the boundaries thereof, and
the defendant, having paid the full purchase price, was put in pos-
session. The court held that from that time on the defendant was
the full equitable owner of the property and not bound by protec-
tive covenants recorded thereafter without his consent.
The deed to defendant was dated November 6, 1951 and the
protective covenants were not recorded until November 27, 1951.
The court said, "The deed referred to the condition of the records
as they existed on November 6, 1951 and that is all this grantee
could be bound by."'38 The court also found the plaintiffs barred by
laches and estoppel.
The case of Friend v. Stancato39 involved a change in the point
of diversion of water from a ditch. The petitioner asked for a decree
allowing her a change in point of diversion of certain water rights.
The protestant claimed ownership of the water rights involved and
offered to prove his ownership thereof by offering a deed in evi-
dence which was given to his grantor for purposes of correcting the
omission of water rights from a prior deed. The corrective deed
offered was not acknowledged or delivered to the grantee named
therein, but was delivered to the attorney for the protestant. The
protestant made an offer of proof but the court denied admission
of the deed in evidence. The Supreme Court, in reversing judgment
of the trial court, held that an unacknowledged deed may be effec-
tive as a conveyance if execution and delivery thereof are proven
by competent evidence. Delivery of the corrective deed to the suc-
cessor in interest of the grantee named therein was held sufficient
delivery to validate the same where the grantor intended to convey
title thereby. The after-acquired title doctrine applied to vest title
in the successor of the grantee named in the deed.
The case of Gaines v. City of Sterling0 was an action involving
a boundary dispute between owners of two adjacent tracts of land
registered under the Torrens Title Registration Act. 41 Plaintiff
brought an action under rule 10542 to obtain an adjudication of the
location of the common boundary line. The court concluded rule 105
37 Id. at 407, 335 P.2d at 278.
38 Ibid.
39 342 P.2d 643 (Colo. 1959).
40 342 P.2d 651 (Colo. 1959).
41 Colo. Rev. Stat.
42 Co o. R. Civ. P. 105.
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did not apply but held that the complaint stated a claim for relief
under applicable statutory proceedings. 43 The plaintiff contended
that under the Torrens Act a title once registered becomes "forever
binding and conclusive upon all persons."' 44 The court held that the
Torrens Act can have no application to the settlement of a boundary
dispute unless the dispute was adjudicated in the registration pro-
ceedings.
The trial court appointed a commissioner to determine the
north-south center line (the line in dispute) of the section. The
commissioner platted the line without reference to the section
corners but by tying to points three miles distant and correlating
his calculations with an old ditch filing, an abandoned road and
other obscure monuments. The commissioner's platting of the north-
south center line resulted in 2578 feet on one side of center, and
2740 feet on the other side of center, on the north line of the section.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in accepting the
commissioner's findings, stating that the rule of single apportion-
ment should have been applied by locating the section corners first
and then locating the north quarter corner as equidistant between
the section corners. Thus where section and quarter section corners
have been obliterated and there is an interior boundary line dispute
with no adequate evidence before the trial court of the correct pos-
sessory lines, the correct rule to determine an interior quarter sec-
tion line as stated by the court "is first to relocate the exterior sec-
tion corners and then proceed to locate the quarter section corners
by applying the procedure set out in CRS 136-1-1. This statute ap-
plies the principle of the single apportionment rule. ' 45
In Scott v. Powers,46 plaintiff's land was bounded on the north
by a state highway and on the east by a county road. Plaintiff con-
veyed a portion of his land to defendant's predecessors "subject,
however, to the right-of-way for roads and ditches as now con-
structed, it being the intention hereof to exclude the county road
from this conveyance. '47 The trial court found that no access road
to plaintiff's land had ever existed as claimed so that none could
be reserved under the wording "as now constructed." The plaintiff
further claimed an easement by prescription. The court correctly
held that while parcels of land are under a common ownership, no
43 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 118-11-1 (1953).
44 Cola. Rev. Stat. 1 118-10-30 (1953).
45 342 P.2d at 656.
46 342 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1959).
47 Id. at 665.
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rights by prescription can accrue against any future servient
portion.
An interesting case is American Lutheran Church v. Evangel-
ical Lutheran St. Paul's Church.48 The American Church brought
an action to have a deed to the Evangelical Church declared null
and void. It appeared that plaintiff's congregation met and voted
to disband. Three individuals were selected to execute the deed in
question to defendant. Plaintiff's constitution vested the power to
convey real property in the board of trustees. The Supreme Court
held that the purported conveyance by the designated individuals
under the attempted action and authority of the congregation was
void and illegal as ultra vires. This case should serve as a lesson
for those who contemplate the purchase of property from religious
corporations to search the constitution and by-laws of the corpora-
tion for the appropriate method of conveying real estate.
In the case of Clopine v. Kemper,4 9 the plaintiff sought to quiet
title against defendant's rights, if any, arising by virtue of the filing
of a lis pendens in a divorce action. The defendant had filed a lis
pendens describing the real property involved which stated the
names of the parties and the nature of the claim asserted in the
action. Subsequently, plaintiff purchased the property and sought
to quiet title against the lis pendens. Plaintiff asserted that the lis
pendens was of no force and effect in that the complaint in the
divorce action did not describe "any real property." The trial court's
entry of judgment against plaintiff was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. In its opinion the Supreme Court held that under rule
105(f)50 it is no longer necessary to describe the real property in-
volved in the complaint but such property need only be described
in the recorded lis pendens. The court stated, "It is the notice of
lis pendens and not the pleadings which give constructive notice of
pending litigation affecting interests in realty."5 1 The court held
further that the divorce action was a proper subject of lis pendens
where division of property was sought.
Plaintiff also urged for reversal that the lis pendens was void
in that it was recorded three days before the complaint was filed
in the civil action. The plaintiff cited rule 105(f) which provides,
"After filing any pleading wherein affirmative relief is claimed ...
a party may file . . .a notice of lis pendens .... "M2 The court dis-
posed of this argument by holding that the action had commenced
upon the issuance of summons and that the lis pendens filed there-
after was valid. This would seem to be contrary to the wording of
the rule, but as the court stated, it was immaterial whether notice
of the lis pendens began running July 3 or July 6 as the plaintiff
had purchased the property more than two years after the lis
pendens was recorded and thus was in no position to rely upon a
technical non-compliance with the rule.
48 343 P.2d 711 (Colo. 1959).
49 344 P.2d 451 (Colo. 1959).
50 Colo. R. Civ. P. 105 (f).
51 344 P.2d at 454.
52 Colo. R. Civ. P. 105 (f).
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THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN IN COLORADO
By The Honorable Philip B. Gilliam
Judge of the Denver Juvenile Court
To have the knowledge necessary to handle adoption proceed-
ings in the county and juvenile courts, the practicing attorney must
be familiar not only with the Colorado statutory chapter on adop-
tions,1 but also with the closely related provisions on relinquish-
ment 2 and the policies and rules of the particular county or juvenile
court. It is the purpose of this article to review the various laws and
policies relating to the adoption of minors, which include many re-
cent legislative changes, and to discuss some questionable areas in
the law.
The juvenile court of Denver and the county courts elsewhere
in the state have jurisdiction of all adoptions of minor children.
3
Prior to a 1949 amendment, venue was determined by the residence
of either the petitioner or the child. The present statute allows a
child to be adopted in any county in which he is located, or in which
the licensed agency having his custody is located, as well as in any
county in which the petitioner is domiciled. 4 Presumably, a child is
"located" in a county if he is physically present there. If this is
true, the present venue provision is extremely broad, allowing an
adoption proceeding in any county as long as the child is brought
within that county.
For several purposes, Colorado law separates adoptions into
two categories: (1) adoptions by a relative or stepparent; (2) other
adoptions, which this article will refer to as "stranger" adoptions.5
In the case of a stranger adoption, the child may not be placed for
the purpose of adoption unless the rights of the natural parents, or
the mother alone in the case of a child born out of wedlock,6 have
been terminated. Termination of parental rights may be affected
through a statutory relinquishment proceeding or through a statu-
tory dependency proceeding.
7
No parent may relinquish a child other than in compliance with
the statutory provisions.8 To illustrate these provisions, take the
case of an unwed mother desiring to relinquish her child. The law
requires that she be thoroughly counseled before she appears in
court.9 This counseling is usually done by an agency social worker.
The mother then appears in court to sign the necessary papers: a
petition for relinquishment, a consent to adoption and relinquish-
ment of rights, and, as an additional precaution, a questionnaire
pertaining to her desire to relinquish, her understanding of the pro-
ceeding, and the adequacy of the counseling she has received. After
filling out the papers, she appears before the judge who examines
1 Colo. Rev. Stat., ch. 4 (1953).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat., ch. 4, art. 5 (1953).
3 Colo. Rev. Stat. 9 4-1-2 (1953). Adults also nay be adopted in Colorado for the purpose of
becoming heirs at low, and these proceedings are under the jurisdiction of the county and district
courts. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-13 (1953).
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-2 (1953).
5 See Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 39, I 1; Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 71, § 1.
6 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 70, I 1.
7 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 71 1 1 (2). Dependency proceedings are covered by Colo. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 22, art. 1 (1953).
8 Id.
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 22-5.2 (1953); Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 70, § 2.
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her as to her desire to relinquish the child. If the court is satisfied
that this is her desire, that she has been fully counseled, and that
the relinquishment is for the best interest of the child and all par-
ties, the relinquishment is ordered and the child received by the
court. The final order terminates all legal rights and obligations
between the parent and child, and the court may place the child
with whomsoever it desires. 10 The Denver juvenile court invariably
uses the various placing social agencies to select a proper home for
the child.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has held an adoption decree to
be void on its face in a case of a stranger adoption in which the
statutory relinquishment provisions were not followed:
It is at once apparent that a statutory relinquishment can-
not be waived because it is a part of the court process in
such matters. It is necessary in order that the parent be
under the jurisdiction of the court where the other statu-
10 Colo. Soso. Laws 1959, ch. 70, 1 3.
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tory provision of counselling and guidance can be given.
An attempt to relinquish a minor child to an individual is
without any force or effect. Consent alone adds nothing in
the way of giving jurisdiction to the court. None of these
statutory requirements were met according to the record in
this case. That being true, the county court could not enter
a valid adoption decree, and the decree is thereby abso-
lutely void on its face and may be the subject of a collateral
attack .... 1
Whether a child who is relinquished in another state may be
adopted in Colorado is a question with which the statutes do not
deal and which has never been decided by the Colorado Supreme
Court. Colorado relinquishment provisions requiring proper coun-
seling and court procedures protect the relinquishing parent and
are strictly construed by the courts.'2 In many other states, the
relinquishment law is not nearly so strict, sometimes requiring
only the signing of a paper by the parent. Would a Colorado adop-
tion based on an out-of-state relinquishment which does not meet
the high standards of the Colorado relinquishment- law be subject
to attack? This question has not been officially answered, but in
practice most Colorado courts do give full faith and credit to a
relinquishment which would be valid in another state.
If the person desiring to adopt the child is a relative or step-
parent of the child, a statutory relinquishment proceeding is not
required by law.13 However, some courts do require a formal relin-
quishment in relative adoptions as a matter of policy, in order to
more fully protect the natural parent from a hurried or coerced
decision. Furthermore, many courts will not allow a stepparent to
petition for an adoption until the couple has been married for a
reasonable length of time, such as six months. The reasons for this
rule are obvious.
Once it is determined that the child has been validly relin-
quished or parental rights terminated in a dependency proceeding,
or that court rules regarding relative and stepparent adoptions have
been fulfilled, the actual adoption proceeding may be commenced.
Any person over twenty-one years of age may petition the court
to adopt a child, and shall petition jointly with a living spouse if
the spouse is not the natural or adoptive parent of the child.14 If the
petitioner is not a relative or stepparent and has taken custody of
the child for purposes of adoption, the petition shall be filed within
thirty days after such placement, unless the court finds there was
reasonable cause or excusable neglect for not so filing. The peti-
tion shall include the following information: names, birthdates and
birthplaces, religions and residences of each petitioner and the child;
relationship, if any, of child to petitioner; full name by which child
shall be known; description of child's property, if any; names and
addresses of child's parents, if known; names and addresses of child's
guardians of the person and the estate, if any; name of the agency to
which the child has been relinquished or custody given; and length
11 Fackerell v. District Court, 133 Colo. 370, 374-75, 295 P.2d 682, 684 (1956).
12 Id.
13 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 71, § 1.
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 4.1.3 (1953).
15 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 39, 9 1.
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of time child has been in the care of petitioner.16 One copy of the
petition, which must be verified by affidavit of petitioner, is re-
quired for the court records.
Accompanying every petition must be a written and notarized
statement of consent. 17 Unless the adoption consent provisions are
read in close conjunction with Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 71 § 1, they
do not give a true picture, 'for they appear to require statements of
consent from natural parents in all types of adoptions. However,
parental rights of the natural parents must have been terminated by
a relinquishment or dependency proceeding in all cases of stranger
adoptions,18 and therefore no consent from natural parents is neces-
sary. In a stranger adoption, therefore, consents must be obtained
from the following: (1) the child to be adopted if he is twelve years
of age or older; and (2) either (a) the legal guardian of the child if
such guardian has parental rights; or (b) the agency or body which
has been given custody of the child and the right to consent to an
adoption.
In relative or stepparent adoptions, consents must be obtained
from a child of twelve or older, from any legal guardian with par-
ental rights, and in addition from the natural parent or parents if
they are alive and have not lost their parental rights. For purposes
16 Colo. Rev. Stat. I 4-1-6 (1953).
17 The section reads as follows:
(1) Every petition for adoption shall be accompanied by written statements of consent, sub-
scribed and sworn to by the persons giving such consent before a person authorized by law to
administer an oath.
(2) Consent to any proposed adoption shall be obtained from:
(a) The person to be adopted if he is twelve years of age or over; and
(b) Both natural parents, except in case of a child born out of wedlock, if they are alive
and have not lost their parental rights through court action or voluntary relinquishment, aban-
donment, or by reason of having failed without cause to provide reasonable support for such
child for a period of one year or more; or
(c) One natural parent, if the other is not alive or has lost his parental rights; or
(d) The mother of a child born out of wedlock, except that if the child has been legitimated
according to the laws of any jurisdiction, the consent of the father shall then also be required,
if he is alive and has not subsequently lost his parental rights through court action or voluntary
relinquishment or abandonment; or
(e) The mother of a child born in wedlock as a result of an extramarital relationship, if the
illegitimacy of the child has been established by a court of competent jurisdiction, and notice
has been given to the husband of the mother of the child; or
(f) The legal guardian of the person to be adopted, if parental rights have been transferred
by court action to such guardian; or
(g) The board of control of the Colorado state children's home or the superintendent of said
home or the executive head of any public welfare department or of any licensed private child
care or placement institution or agency which through court action or voluntary relinquishment
has been given the care, custody and control of the person to be adopted including the right to
consent to such adoption.
(3) The minority of a natural parent shall not be a bar to such parent's consent to adoption,
and the adoption shall not thereby be invalidated, provided, a court of competent jurisdiction
has decreed the relinquishment of said child and affirmed subsequent adoption.
18 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 71, § 1 (2). Fackerell v. District Court, 133 Cola. 370, 295 P.2d 682
(1956).
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of this provision, parental rights may be lost through court action
or voluntary relinquishment, abandonment, or by reason of having
failed without cause to provide reasonable support for such child
for a period of one year or more.19 This situation usually arises in
a stepparent adoption. The natural parents are divorced and the
mother, having custody of the child, is remarried. The new husband
desires to adopt the child, but the former husband and natural father
refuses to consent to the adoption. No adoption may be granted
without his consent unless the natural father has lost his parental
rights. If, for example, the natural father has failed to support the
child for more than one year or has abandoned the child, such fact
may be alleged in the petition and proved at the adoption hearing.
Proper notice must be given to the former husband so that he may
defend the action.
If a child is born in wedlock but as a result of an extramarital
relationship, the mother alone may consent, but only if the illegiti-
macy of the child has been established by a court and notice has
been given to the legal husband. 20 Thus, if the illegitimacy of the
child has not been established, the husband of the mother is pre-
sumed to be the father and his consent is necessary.
Only the mother's consent is necessary if a child has been born
out of wedlock unless the child has been legally legitimated and the
father has not lost his parental rights."1
Notice to interested parties is required by statute in the case of
the adoption of a child not a grandchild or stepchild of the petition-
er.22 Does this mean that a petition may be filed for the adoption of
a stepchild or grandchild, alleging the loss of parental rights by the
natural parent, without giving notice of the adoption hearing to
such natural parent? If this is the meaning, it raises a serious con-
stitutional question as to the natural parent's right to notice. As a
matter of practice, most courts do insist upon notice in such cases,
even though it is apparently not required by law.
It has earlier been pointed out that notice must be given to the
husband of the mother of a child born as a result of an extramarital
relationship, even though illegitimacy has been established by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
2 3
A hearing on a stranger adoption may not be less than thirty
days after the filing of the petition.24 In all of these types of adop-
tions, a written social investigation must be made and filed with the
court at least one week prior to the date fixed for a hearing. Such
report may be made by a licensed agency, the court's probation de-
partment, or other appropriate officer, and its scope is specifically
set forth in the statutes.25 Many courts hold a preliminary hearing
at the time of the filing of the petition for the purpose of setting the
hearing date, ordering the social investigation to be made, and ap-
proving the placement of the child.
The detailed investigation report is not required to be made in
cases of relative or stepparent adoptions. Neither is a waiting period
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 4-1-6 (2) (b) (1953).
20 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 4,1-6 (2) (e) (1953).
21 Colo. Rev. Stat. U 4.1.6 (2) (d) (1953).
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-8 (1953).
23 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 4-1-6 (2) (e) (1953).
24 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 39, 1I (2).
25 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 39, § 1(2)(a)-(f).
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required after filing the petition; the hearing may be held forthwith
and the adoption decree granted.
2 6
The lack of an investigation report in relative and stepparent
adoptions raises a problem. It is required by statute that the judge
satisfy himself as to four specific issues of fact at the adoption hear-
ing. These are as follows: (a) The genuineness of consent to such
adoption and the legal authority of the person or persons signing
such consent; (b) The good moral character, ability to support and
educate such child and the suitability of the home of the person
or persons adopting such child for said child; (c) The mental and
physical condition of the child as a proper subject for adoption in
said home; and (d) The fact that the best interests of the child will
be served by said adoption.
27
In stranger adoptions, the court has before it, pursuant to stat-
ute, a written report of a social agency or its own probation depart-
ment covering inter alia, these four areas. Since this report is not
required in relative and stepparent adoptions, evidence should be
presented at the hearing which will give the court a basis for mak-
ing these findings.
Two certified copies of the final court order are given to the
adopting parents, one of which may be taken to the state registrar
who will then prepare a birth certificate in the new name of the
adopted person, showing the adoptive parents as the father and
mother.
28
26 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 39, 11(1).
27 Cola. Rev. Stat. 1 4-1-9 (1) (a)-(d)(1953).
28 Colo. Rev. Stat. 9 66-8-14 (1953).
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One other statutory requirement should be pointed out. No
money or other compensation in connection with an adoption may
be offered, given or received except attorneys' fees and other fees
approved by the court. The penalty for violation of this provision is
a fine of not more than $500 or a prison term of not more than one
year, or both.
2 9
The reason for this provision is clearly to prevent the "sale" of
babies. In most states of the nation, legislative attempts have been
made to regulate the placement of children for purposes of adopt-
tion, and in a great number of the states, unfortunately, this has not
been too effective. There are still a great number of children placed
by independent or private placement. The selection of a family for
the purpose of adoption and actual placing of the child with the
family is the function of a social agency and not the function of a
court. The court should handle the legal phases of an adoption, but
not the placing of the child. Through a careful medical, emotional
and social study, the social agency has the opportunity to choose
correctly from among the numerous applicants. Parents wishing to
adopt a child are treated fairly; social position, wealth or whom they
happen to know do not place them at any advantage or disadvan-
tage. Furthermore, there is complete confidentiality; the natural
mother does not know where the child is placed and the adopting
parents do not know the mother, as they do in an independent
placement.
29 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 4-1-14 (1953).
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INVASION OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY-
STATUS IN COLORADO
By JOE C. MEDINAt
The doctrine of invasion of the right of privacy represents a
landmark in the annals of American jurisprudence. This modern
doctrine is predicated on the premise that every man is endowed
with a "right to be let alone"' and its evolution is a noteworthy in-
dication of progressive legal thinking on the part of American
jurists.
Scientific and technological advances in the fields of communi-
cations and transportation have created unlimited means of invad-
ing an individual's seclusion. At the same time, the closely guarded
constitutional freedoms of the press and speech have given to pub-
lishers a nearly unrestricted right to publish anything at will and
have, therefore, given impetus to the publication of an individual's
private affairs. The coupling of these forces has augmented the op-
portunities and the means of intruding into one's privacy. In view
of such a highly developed society, it was inevitable that a right of
action would evolve to protect an individual from unwarranted in-
trusions into his private life.
HISTORY OF THE TORT
The tort of invasion of the right of privacy is one of the few
doctrines among myriad legal concepts which enjoy the distinction
of having been created in the minds of American legal thinkers.
While some analogy to this tort may be drawn from Greek and
Roman law which recognized injuria to a person's honor and digni-
ty,2 the common law of England was silent as to a cause of action
for intrusions into an individual's private life. It thus fell upon
American jurists to recognize the existence of a right of privacy and
to create a cause of action for its invasion.
A famous article appearing in the Harvard Law Review in 18903
is generally credited for the widespread acceptance of the. idea that
an invasion of an individual's right of privacy constitutes a cause
of action.4 Following that article, New York was the first jurisdic-
tion to consider the question whether a right of privacy exists as an
independent legal concept. A divided court in Roberson V. Roches-
ter Folding Box Co.' negatived the existence of the right by rea-
soning that recognition of a right of privacy would lead to myriad
claims and absurdities in the law. The leading case affirming the
existence of the right of privacy is Pavesich v. New England Life
Ins. Co." In the course of its opinion in the Pavesich case, the Geor-
gia Supreme Court said: "We venture to predict that the American
Bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained by judg-
tStudent, University of Denver College of Low
1 Cooley, Torts 29 (2d ed. 1888).
2 Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 343 (lW15).
3 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
4 See, e.g., Prosser, Torts 635 (2d ed. 1955).
5 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
6 122 Go. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
DICTA
MARCH-APRIL 1960
es of eminence and ability. '7 Indeed, this prophecy has come to
pass, for today the tort of invasion of the right of privacy is recog-
nized by a majority of American jurisdictions.8
The Restatement of Torts9 has adopted the majority view that a
right of action under common law principles follows an invasion of
the right of privacy. Four states, New York,
10 Oklahoma," Utah,12
and Virginia 13 have announced a limited statutory recognition of
this right.' 4 Of these states, only New York has rejected the cause
of action under principles of the common law. 15 Several states, in-
cluding Colorado, have avoided the question whether a right of
privacy exists as a separate legal concept, but have allowed recov-
ery for typical invasions of the right under the guise of other con-
cepts, such as defamation1 6 and breach of contract. 17 Only three
states, Rhode Island,18 Texas, 19 and Wisconsin,20 have totally reject-
ed the existence of the right of privacy as an independent concept
of the common law.
UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY OF THE TORT
The reasoning of the courts in arriving at a recognition of the
right of privacy has been as impressive as the philosophical con-
cepts which underlie the existence of our democratic system of gov-
ernment. Thus the courts have generally resorted to fundamental
law as the basis for the existence of this individual right. The ma-
jority of the courts have reasoned that the right of privacy is root-
ed in natural instincts and the law of nature.21 This reasoning ap-
pears to be predicated on the premise that man is endowed with an
inherent right to live his life in seclusion if he so chooses.
7 Id. in 50 S.E. at 81.
8 See, e.g., Prosser, Torts 636-637 (2d ed. 1955).
9 § 867 (1939).
10 N.Y. Civil Rights Law §150,51.
11 Okla. Stat. 11 839, 840 (Supp. 1955).
12 Utah Code Ann. 11 76-4-7 to 9 (1953).
13 Virginia Code Ann. 1 8-650 (1950).
14 E.g., N. Y. Civil Rights Law 11 50, 51 limit recovery for the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's
name, portrait or picture for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade.
15 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
16 Turner v. Brien, 184 Iowa 320, 167 N.W. 584 (1918); Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman, Inc., 181
Ky. 487, 205 S.W. 558 (1918); Hutchins v. Page, 75 N.H. 215, 72 AtI. 689 (1909).
17 McCreery v. Miller's Groceteria Co., 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1936); Fitzsimmons v. Olinger
Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932); Bennet v. Gusdorf, 101 Mont. 39, 53 P.2d 91 (1935).
18 Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 Atli. 97 (1909).
19 Milner v. Red River Valley Publishing Co., 249 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
20 Yoeckel v. Somonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956); Judevine v. Benzies Montanye Fuel &
Whse. Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936).
21 E.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905)(leading case).
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Other courts have based their decisions on the "life, liberty and
pursuit of happiness" expressions of the Declaration of Independ-
ence22 and in the due process clauses of the federal and state con-
stitutions.23 This reasoning, however, loses its significance when it
is remembered that constitutional rights are restrictions placed
upon the government in its official capacity and not upon individ-
uals in the normal intercourse of society. The Supreme Court of
the United States has significantly held that the Federal Constitu-
tion does not confer any right of privacy that is beyond the power
of the states to restrict.
24
Still other courts have based their decisions upon the theory
that the right of privacy is a property right.25 This theory advances
the proposition that any element of an individual's personality is as
inviolable as his tangible property. The "property right" theory
might easily be explained as a fiction through which the courts
have acquired equity jurisdiction for the protection of the purely
personal right of privacy.
NATURE OF THE TORT
The doctrine of invasion of the right of privacy had its incep-
tion at the turn of the twentieth century; hence, it is a young doc-
trine which might properly be considered still to be in the em-
byronic stages of evolution. In considering the right of privacy
cases, the courts have been primarily concerned with the question
whether the law contemplates the existence of a right of privacy
as a separate and independent legal concept. The nature of the tort
of invasion of the right of privacy has thus enjoyed little discussion
in the cases. It appears, nevertheless, that this doctrine permits a
remedy for several distinct wrongs, each of which, although bear-
ing little resemblance to each other, constitutes an unwarranted in-
trusion into an individual's private life.
One phase of the doctrine of invasion of the right of privacy
affords a remedy for unauthorized appropriations of the plaintiff's
personality for commercial purposes, as in advertising 26 or in ex-
ploiting the plaintiff's personality for profit.2 7 It is significant to
note that the statutory right of privacy 28 applies solely to this phase
of the doctrine; i.e., it has been limited to permit recovery only for
unauthorized commercial use of the individual's personality.29
A second phase of the doctrine of the right of privacy protects
a person from intrusions into his physical solitude and seclusion.
Thus a physical search in public of the plaintiff's person,30 wire-
tapping,31 compulsory blood tests,3 2 unauthorized entries into the
22 Peed v. Washington Times Co., 55 Wash. L. Rep. 182 (D.C. 1927).
23 E.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
24 Prudential Ins. Co. y. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
25 Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1
9
02)(dissenting opinion); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22
(1895) (dissenting opinion).
26 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905)(leading case); Eick v. Perk
Dog Food Co., 347 III. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App.
643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949); Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn,
134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909); Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911
(1948); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212
N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1933).
27 Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951); Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78
F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948); Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co., 207 Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 1955)(decided under N.Y. statute).
28 See statutes cited in notes 10-13 supro.
29 See explanation cited in note 14 supra.
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person's quarters,33 and investigations of his private bank account
records34 have been held to be invasions of the right of privacy.
The doctrine of the right of privacy also provides a remedy for
unauthorized publicity given to an individual's private affairs. This
phase of the doctrine is designed to protect the individual from
that type of publicity which violates ordinary decencies, as in pub-
licizing the details of an embarrassing or humiliating illness, 35 or the
notorious past life of the plaintiff,36 or the fact that he has not paid
his debts.37 While commercialization of the individual's personality
is not an essential element to this phase of the tort, it appears that
a defamatory innuendo is indispensable to a good cause of action.
Still a fourth phase of this doctrine protects a person from that
type of publicity which places him in a false, although not neces-
sarily defamatory, light. Thus, liability for invasion of the right of
privacy has been found in signing the plaintiff's name to a telegram
without his knowledge 3 and in placing the plaintiff's picture in a
rogue's gallery.
39
It is demonstrated, therefore, that an unwarranted intrusion
into an individual's private life is a necessary characteristic of each
of the wrongs which comprise the tort of invasion of the right of
privacy. The protection of a person's peace of mind or mental soli-
30 Bennet v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959).
31 McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939); Rhodes v.
Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931); Roach v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W.Va. 1958).
32 Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (Ch. 1940).
33 Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951) (entry by sheriff to make unlawful
arrest); Byfield v. Candler, 33 Go. App. 275, 125 S.E. 905 (1
9 2
4)(entry into woman's bedroom on
steamboat and attempted rope); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (unauthorized
entry by landlord).
34 Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936) (unreasonable search case where court said, at
page 849: "(W)e regard the search here asserted as a violation of the natural law of privacy in one's
own affairs . . . And that right extends to the records of his transactions from unreasonable inspection
and examination thereof by unwarranted governmental search. If due protection of this natural right
be denied him by the courts, his other rights and his citizenship lose their value.")
35 ocrrr v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
36 Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Poc. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
37 Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927); Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright,





)(letter to plaintiff's employer advising of contemplated garnishee action held not to be in.
vasion of the right of privacy); Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835
(1956)(letter to plaintiff's employer advising of plaintiff's debt held not to be invasion of the right of
privacy in cbsen-a of defendr:nt's bad faith). But cf., Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340
(Ohio Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd 99 Ohio App. 485, 135 N.E.2d 440 (1
9
55)(extreme harrassment of plaintiff
and repeated telephone calls to plaintiff's employer held to be invasion of the right of privacy).
38 Hinish v. Meier, 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941). Cf., Schwartz v. Edrington, 133 La. 235, 62
So. 660 (1913) (whcn plaintiffs signed a certain co:ument due to a misunderstanding and later re-
pudiated their signatures, injunction against defendants to cease publication of plaintiffs' names as
signers of the document was held to be properly issued).
39 State ex ret. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946); McGovern v. Van Ripper,
137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (Ch. 1945), aff'd 137 N.J. Eq. 548, 45 A.2d 842 (Ct. Errors and Appeals
1945).
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tude also appears to be a vital characteristic underlying the cause
of action.
The various combinations of wrongs which comprise the tort of
invasion of the right of privacy appear to create an enigmatic haze
as to just what it is that the cause of action is designed to protect.
This enigma is further increased by the fact that the line of demar-
cation between the tort of invasion of the right of privacy and other
tort actions such as nuisance, trespass, and intentional infliction of
mental anguish is not as clearly drawn as the distinctions that exist
between other legal concepts.
LIMITATIONS OF THE ACTION
The purpose for which the doctrine of invasion of the right of
privacy is designed is further clouded by the numerous limitations
to which it is subjected, for the right of privacy is by no means an
absolute right. The foremost of these limitations is the public in-
terest. This limitation in effect declares that any invasion of an-
other's privacy is justified if it serves to promote the public interest.
Thus the constitutionally-protected freedom of the press to publish
newsworthy items is usually placed ahead of an individual's right
of privacy.4" But some of the better reasoned cases have allowed
recovery of damages for the unwarranted publication of news items
which violate ordinary decencies. 41 Thus it is generally held that a"public figure" who voluntarily places himself in the public spot-
light becomes a legitimate subject of news and will not be heard to
complain; 42 but the public interest does not go so far as to permit
the personality of such a public figure to be exploited for commer-
cial gain.43  Similarly, one placed in the public limelight involun-
tarily is held to have surrendered his right of privacy for such a
period as he remains a "public character.14 4 The reason for this
limitation is that the mere satisfaction of public curiosity tran-
scends an individual's right to live in seclusion.4'5 In any event, it is
not difficult to see the problems which face the courts in attempt-
ing to balance the conflicting interests represented by an individ-
ual's right of privacy on the one hand, and the public interest on the
other.
Since the right of privacy is a personal one, it is subject to the
limitation that no right of action survives the individual whose
privacy has been violated. 4" But a surviving relative may maintain
40 See e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
41 See cases cited in notes 34-36 supro.
42 Thompson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 193 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1
9 5 2
)(inventor); Cohen v. Marx, 94
Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (Dist. Ct. App. 1
9
50)(prize fighter); Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 668, 50
So. 2d 391 (1
9
51)(public officer).
43 Bell v. Birmingham Broadcasting Co., 266 Ala. 266, 96 So. 2d 253 (1957)(radio personality);
Jansen v. Hilo Packing Co., 202 Misc. 900, 118 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1952), off'd
282 App. Div. 935, 125 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1953)(professional baseball player)(decision under N.Y. statute);
Fisher v. Murray M. Rosenberg, Inc., 175 Misc. 370, 23 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1940)
(doncer)(decision under N.Y. statute). But cf., Toscani v. Hersey, 271 App. Div. 445, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814
(1946)(use of fictitious name in a play portraying plaintiff's life held not invasion of the right of
privacy of a public official)(decision under N.Y. statute).
44 Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supa. 957 (D. Minn. 1948)(one engaged in divorce
proceedings); Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946)(one accused of crime); Jones v.
Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929)(one present at the scene of a crime).
45 Restatement, Torts I 867, comment c (1939). " . . . until they hoave reverted to the lawful and
unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community, they ore subject to the privileges which pub-
lishers have to satisfy the curiosity of the public as to their leaders, heroes, villains and victims."
46 M tter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. Apo. 2d 304. 95 P.2d 491 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); cf., Reed




the action, if he too was affected by the invasion.47 The personal
element also dictates that neither a corporation48 nor a dog 49 enjoys
a right of privacy.
A cause of action for invasion of the right of privacy is further
limited by the requirement that the plaintiff must be a person of
"ordinary" sensibilities.5" Still other limitations include the fact
that the right of privacy may be surrendered by the consent of the
plaintiff5' and cannot be violated by an oral publication of the
plaintiff's private affairs.
52
STATUS OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN COLORADO
Colorado has generally been classified as a state which has
avoided the question whether the right of privacy exists as a sep-
arate and independent concept of the law.53 Nevertheless, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court has permitted recovery for typical invasions
of the right of privacy by employing other established doctrines.
Recovery has been allowed for the unauthorized use of one's pic-
ture54 and the picture of a plaintiff's decedent accompanied by the
plaintiff's name 55 for advertising purposes. These cases stand for
the proposition that substantial damages are recoverable for the
"mental pain and suffering" caused by an intentional breach of con-
tract. While the latter cases were decided by resorting to the fic-
tional "implied contract" theory, the Colorado Supreme Court en-
countered little difficulty in avoiding the question of the existence
of the right of privacy. Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court has
permitted recovery of damages for the "mental pain and suffering"
47 Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); Douglas v. Stakes, 149 Ky.
506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912).
48 Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W.2d 369 (19431; Shubert v. Columbia Pictures
Corp., 189 Misc. 734, 72 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1947), aff'd 274 App. Div. 751, 80
N.Y.S.2d 724 (1947).
49 Lawrence v. Ylla, 184 Misc. 807, 55 N.Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1945).
50 E.g., Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kans. 275, 262 P.2d 808 (1953)(use of plaintiff's
picture in advertising matter held not to be invasion of the right of privacy when embarrassment re-
suiting from friends' teasing and "kidding" was the only evidence of damage).
51 Marek v. Zanol Products Co., 298 Mass. 1, 9 N.E.2d 393, (1937); Thayer v. Worchester Post Co.,
284 Mass. 160, 187 N.E. 292 (1933).
52 Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947). But
cf., Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (D. Cal. 1939)(right of privacy invaded by radio
broadcast); Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959)(repeated oral pub-
lication of plaintiff's debt in the presence of numerous customers in a public restaurant where plaintiff
was employed was held by the court to be so aggravated, that the general rule that oral publicity
will not give rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy was not applicable).
53 See e.g., Prosser, Torts 636-37 (2d ed. 1955).
54 McCreery v. Miller's Groceteria Co., 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1936).
55 Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932).
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caused by an unauthorized physical intrusion into a person's quar-
ters.
56
An unreported Colorado district court decision permitted re-
covery of actual and exemplary damages and issued injunctive re-
lief for intrusion into one's physical solitude by extreme harrass-
ment over the telephone.57 While the latter case did not proceed to
56 Sager v. Sisters of Mercy, 81 Colo. 498, 256 Pac. 8 (1927).
57 Cooper v. Backus, Docket No. B-1234, Denver Dist. Ct., Dec. 14, 1956 (case originally filed os
Cooper v. John Doe. Defendants harrossed the plaintiffs by making numerous obscene telephone cals
over a six month period).
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the Supreme Court, it is not difficult to see that recovery could
easily have been predicated under the laws of nuisance or inten-
tional infliction of mental anguish.
It appears, therefore, that the Colorado courts have rendered
substantial justice without the necessity of recognizing the exist-
ence of the right of privacy. Yet, an isolated Colorado case may be
cited as authority for the proposition that substantial damages are
not recoverable for the "mental pain and suffering" caused by a
negligent or passive breach of contract.58 In view of the latter pro-
position, it is conceivable that in future cases involving invasion
of privacy, the plaintiff could be without a remedy if the attempted
recovery is predicated on a breach of "implied" contract and the
breach was not an intentional breach by the defendant.
It has been suggested that in In re Hearings Concerning Canon
35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics 9 the Colorado Supreme Court
might have announced its recognition of the existence of the right
of privacy.6 0 True, the court alluded to the right of privacy in that
case,61 but it is inconceivable that mere allusion can be tantamount
to recognition. In Hearings Concerning Canon 35, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that radio and television broadcasting of trial
proceedings is permissible at the discretion of the trial court. That
decision is indicative of the constant vigilance which the courts ex-
ercise over the constitutional freedoms of the press and speech.
Superficially at least, the situation in Colorado has remained un-
changed and the near-absolute freedom of the press prevails over
any individual's right to live in seclusion.
CONCLUSION
A doctrine of law which has gained acceptance by such a clear
weight of authority, as has the doctrine of invasion of the right of
privacy, is deserving of inquiry to determine its merits and the
validity of its existence. It is hoped that the Colorado Supreme
Court will embark upon such an inquiry, when the next invasion of
privacy case is presented for adjudication, to settle the status of the
right of privacy in Colorado.
58 Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913).
59 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956).
60 Comment, 29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 272 (1957).
61 132 Colo. 591, at 599, 296 P.2d 465, at 470 (1956), the Supreme Court of Colorado, stated:
"(W)hen one becomes identified with an occurence of public interest, he emerges from his seclusion
and it is not on invasion of his right of privacy to publish his photograph or to otherwise give pub-
licity to his connection with that event."
Trust The Moving and Storage Requirements
Of Your Clients-
To Men Who Understand Your Problems.
CONFER WITH DON JOHNSON
JOHNSON STORAGE & MOVING CO.
Affiliated With United Van Lines
221 Pearl
Broadway Local and World-wide 3-2433
DICTA
MARCH-APRIL 1960 DICTA
TRIAL BY LAWYER PANEL:
A SOLUTION TO TRIAL COURT BACKLOGS?
BY JOHN A. TUCKER, JR.
Mr. Tucker received his LL.B. from the
University of Denver College of Law in 1959.
A fundamental problem that faces litigants in personal injury
jury cases is the delay from the time they are at issue to the time
when they finally reach trial. The Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion reports that in 1959 this time averaged 10.1 months in the state
courts.'
Pennsylvania has endeavored to remedy its problem by enact-
ing, in 1952, a Compulsory Arbitration Statute." It provides that
the courts of common pleas3 and the municipal court of Philadel-
phia4 may adopt rules of court compelling cases at issue where the
amount in controversy is $2000 or less and where the subject in-
volved is not real estate, to be tried to a panel composed of three
attorneys from that judicial district.5 Furthermore, where the case
is not yet at issue or where a suit has not been filed, the parties may
agree to refer it to arbitration, with the agreement of reference to
contain those facts and issues to be arbitrated.6
The three member panel is appointed by the prothonotary,
alphabetically, from a list of lawyers who agree to act, unless the
rules of court provide some other method of choice.7 Each board
usually sits for one case except in Philadelphia where it sits for
three cases." No more than one attorney from a single firm shall
sit on the same case." The board is appointed after the case is at
issue or after the filing of the agreement of reference, upon prae-
cipe filed by counsel with notice to opposing counsel. 10 The hear-
ing is called by the chairman, who is usually the first person on the
alphabetical list, and may be held either in a courtroom or in the
office of one of the arbitrators.1 I
1 Institute of Judicial Administration, State Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction Calendar Status
Judy i (1959). The some report shows Denver's District Court has a blacklog of six months. Id. at 1.
2 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 If 1-45 (Purdon Supp. 1958). The plan was an amendment to an existing
arbitration statute passed in 1836. Pa. P.L. 715 (1836). Mr. Walther E. Alessandroni, Chancellor, Phila-
delphia Bar Association, states that it was thought less complicated to amend the original statute than
to draft an entirely new act. He suggests that as a result the name "Compulsory Arbitration" attached
to th- plan. A hetter title, he believes, would be "Trial by Lawyer Panel." The writer has adopted
Mr. Alessandroni's suggestion in the title to this note. Letter from Hon. Walther E. Alessandroni, Chan-
cellor, Philadelphia Bar Association, to DICTA, Nov. 6, 1959, an file in the DICTA office (hereinafter
cited as Alessandroni; Letter of Nov. 6, 1959).
3 The Courts of Common Pleas are courts of general jurisdiction within their respective counties.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17 1 251 (Purdon Supp. 1958).
4 The original statute was amended in 1957 to include the Philadelphia Municipal Court. Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 5 If 23, 30, 57, 73 (Purdon Supp. 1958).
5 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 1 30 (Purdon Supp. 1958); Pa. Ct. of C.P. (Columbia County) R. V 1 3;
Philadelphia, Pa. Municipal Ct., R. for Arbitration I.
6 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 I 30 (Purdon Supp. 1958).
7 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 I 31 (Purdon Supp. 1958).
8 Philadelphia, Pa. Municipal Ct., R. for Arbitration II D.
9 Pa. Stat. Ann. fit. 5 1 31 (Purdon Supp. 1958). Several counties provide that no two attorneys
related by blood or marriage may sit as board members on the some board, nor may an arbitrator sit
who is related by blood or marriage to a litigant. Pa. Cf. of C.P. (Columbia County) R. V I 5.
10 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 1 31(1) (VIII).
11 The time lapse between appointment of the panel and the hearing varies. Compare Philadelphia,
Pa. Municipal Cf., R. for Arbitration III A, where the chairman may fix the date of the hearing not
less than 15 days nor more than 30 days from the date of appointment of the board, with Pa. Ct. of
C.P. (Columbia County) R. V 1 8 which provides that the chairman may set the date for the hearing
not less than 10 nor more than 20 days from appointment of the board.
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Each county establishes the amount paid to the panel members.
This ranges from ten to fifty dollars per case with an extra ten dol-
lars for the chairman.12 The key to the program is that a litigant
may appeal to a jury trial de novo; however, he must first reim-
burse the county for the amount paid to the arbitrators.13 The ap-
pellant cannot recover this amount in any subsequent proceeding.
14
No record is kept of the proceeding, but upon demand of either
party, a reporter must be provided and a record taken. The deman-
dant then is charged with the cost of the record.15 Although most
of the county rules provide that the hearings shall be conducted,
"with due regard to the law according to the established rules of
evidence ".... 16 the decision of the panel may not be set aside be-
cause such rules were not followed since the appeal is to a de novo
jury trial.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Trial by Jury in Civil Cases
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the constitutionali-
ty of the statute in Application of Smith.'T In doing so, it rejected
petitioner's argument that the rules of the Lancaster county court
of common pleas and the statute authorizing them were violations
of the Pennsylvania constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury in
civil cases.18 The court reasoned that a statute making arbitration
the final determination of the parties' rights would violate the con-
stitution.19 Since the litigants have the opportunity of a trial by jury
after the arbitration proceedings, the constitutional guarantee is
satisfied. However, this opportunity "must not be burdened by the
imposition of onerous conditions, restrictions, or regulations which
would make the right practically unavailable. ' 20 The payment of
12 Pa. Stat. Ann. fit. 5 9 129 (Purdon Supp. 1958); Institute of Judicial Administration, Compulsory
Arbitration and Court Congestion 8 (1959). Compare Dill v. Cochran, 15 D.&C.2d 692 (1958) where the
court allowed double payment for two cases that were consolidated into one hearing, with Philadelphia,
Pa. Municipal Ct. R. for Arbitration V A which states that all cases arising out of the same transaction
are considered to be one case so for as compensation for arbitrators is concerned.
13 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 1 71 (Purdon Supp. 1958). This section was amended in 1956 to provide that
the appellant need not pay arbitrators' fees over fifty percent of the amount in controversy. The county
sustains the costs over fifty percent.
14 Ibid. See also Bucciorelli v. DiCicco, 14 D.&C.2d 61 (1958).
15 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 1 121 (Purdon Supp. 1958).
16 Pa. Cf. of C.P. (Columbia County) R. V 1 9.
17 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 appeal dismissed sub nom Smith v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955).
18 Pa. Const. art. I 1 6 provides, "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain
inviolate." The court in Application of Smith, supra note 17, also refused arguments that the limitation
to claims of $1000 was class legislation and that the power of counties to establish their own rules of
compensation for arbitrators was a violation of that section of the constitution providing for uniform
operation of the laws regulating the courts.
19 Accord, Cutler & Hinds v. Richley, 151 Pa. 195, 25 Ati. 96 (1892).
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non-recoverable arbitrators' fees was held not to be such a restric-
tion. It was reasoned that if the recovery of court costs could be
withheld by the legislature, so could arbitration fees.
21
The conflict of the statute with the fourteenth amendment to
the federal constitution was not directly raised. The United States
Supreme Court has held that a state may provide an arbitration
procedure it deems proper so long as its choice is not "unreasonable
or arbitrary.
'22
Such an arbitration statute probably would not violate the jury
provision in Colorado's constitution. The constitution provides, "The
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases; but
a jury in civil cases in all courts .... may consist of less than twelve
persons, as may be prescribed by law. '23 This might be construed
as allowing jury trials in civil actions only when the legislature has
expressly so provided. However, in Denver v. Hyatt,24 the court, in
declaring unconstitutional a statute providing for a verdict by
three-fourths of the jury, held, "the right of trial by jury in civil
cases, as provided by the common law is preserved in all its essen-
tials, except the one of number. ' 25 Therefore, the reasoning of the
Smith26 case would seem applicable: 1) the guarantee of a jury
trial at common law meant a jury trial at some period before a final
determination of the rights of a party, and 2) the right to jury trial
could not be burdened by unreasonable conditions. It would then
be a policy consideration as to whether the payment of non-recover-
able arbitrators' fees was such a restriction.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause
Any arbitration program will be ineffective if sister states do not
enforce the judgments rendered as a result of the awards. Recent-
ly,2 7 an Ohio court of common pleas refused to recognize an award
signed by a prothonotary of Mercer County, Pennsylvania as a
valid judgment enforceable under the full faith and credit clause of
the Federal Constitution. 28 Since that case, the statute has been
amended to read,
... upon being approved by the court, such award
and approval shall be regarded as a judgment of
the court, and the award and approval shall be re-
garded and have the dignity of judicial proceed-
ings within the meaning of Article IV § 1 of the
United States Constitution.
29
Even as here where the state's local policy is declared, the
United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter of what consti-
tutes a judgment within the full faith and credit clause.30 Whether
an award of an arbitration board is a judgment within that clause
seems never to have been ruled upon by that Court. The most au-
21 Ibid. The court commented by way of dictum that to make an appellant pay back the entire
cost where the amount in controversy was small would be unfair. This led to the amendment found in
note 12 supra.
22 Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931).
23 Colo. Const. art. II I 23.
24 28 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 (1900).
25 Id. at 146, 63 Pac. at 409.
26 Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955).
27 In McClure v. Boyle, 141 N.E.2d 229 (Ohio 1957).
28 U.S. Const. art. IV, 1 1.
29 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 I 58.1 (Purdon Supp. 1958).
30 Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
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thoritative decision is by the Maryland Supreme Court which up-
held enforcement of a judgment pursuant to an arbitration award
under an earlier Pennsylvania statute.31
The Colorado Constitutional Arbitration Provision
The Colorado constitution authorizes the legislature to provide
for arbitration legislation.32 The Colorado Supreme Court has held
that under this provision the legislature is empowered to establish
only voluntary arbitration programs. 33 Therefore, it may be argued
that by the mere inclusion of such a provision the framers of the
constitution intended to preclude the passage of compulsory arbi-
tration legislation.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE PLAN
A survey conducted by the Institute of Judicial Administration
presents the most comprehensive report of the Pennsylvania plan's
success. 34 The findings of the survey are summarized in part in the
following paragraphs.
Appeals from Arbitration Awards
In the various counties, the average number of cases decided
during each of the years 1956 through 1958 was 2,181.35 From the
total cases arbitrated, 3.1% were appealed in 1956, 3.8% in 1957, and
4.2% in 1958. Of these cases, reversal or substantial modification of
the award was achieved only in 11.5% of the cases appealed in
1956, 11.1% in 1957, and 10.5% in 1958.36
No figures are available on the number of appeals taken from
awards made in the Philadelphia municipal court, but more than
15,000 cases have been processed since arbitration was commenced
in February, 1958.
37
31 Wernag v. Pawling, 5 G.&J. 500 (Md. 1833); cf. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co. v. Amertotron
Corp., 158 N.E.2d 875 (Mass. 1959), where the court, in deciding another question, assumed an arbi-
tration award should be given full faith and credit.
32 Colo. Const. art. XVIII 1 3.
33 Compulsory Arbitration, 9 Colo. 629, 21 Pac. 274 (1886).
34 Institute of Judicial Administration, Compulsory Arbitration and Court Congestion (1959); see
also, Arbitration Commission, Philadelphia, Pa., Statistical Report, Feb. 17, 1958 to Jun. 33, 1959 (1959);
Comment 2 Vill. L. Rev. 529 (1959); Comment 8 Stan. L. Rev. 410 (1956).
35 Institute of Judicial Administration Compulsory Arbitration and Court Congestion, 6 (1959).
36 Id. at 30.
37 Letter from Hon. Frank Zal, Arbitration Commissioner, Municipal Court of Philadelphia, to










The Effect on Calendar Delay
The Institute of Judicial Administration's study indicated that
about one-third of the counties questioned found a decrease in cal-
endar delay in jury trials; several counties noted that delay was de-
creased in non-jury trials as well. 38 Two counties which saw no
speed-up in jury trials were, nevertheless, able to eliminate a por-
tion of the regular trial term as a result of the plan. Moreover, an
increase in small claims was noted without a corresponding clog-
ging of the courts.
3 9
In Philadelphia, the effects were more dramatic. Mr. Frank
Zal, Commissioner of Arbitration, enumerated the results: 1) a
drastic reduction in the processing time for cases of $2000 or under,
2) a greater flexibility in the scheduling of cases, 3) an incentive
to settle cases privately, 4) the opportunity to increase the munici-
pal court's jurisdiction from $2000 to $5000, 5) a decrease in the
backlog of the court of common pleas (which had not adopted com-
pulsory arbitration), and 6) a faster disposition of cases in the
$2000 to $5000 range by the municipal court. He attributes the suc-
cess of the program to the over-whelming co-operation by the mem-
bers of the bar, who have offered their time and office space.
40
The Effect on Costs
Seven of the counties reported an increase in cost due to the ex-
pense of arbitrators' fees. Twenty-four found no increase and three
found a decrease. One county was able to cancel twelve weeks of
court at a saving of $3500 per week.41 No cost figures are yet avail-
able for Philadelphia.
Some Current Problems
The support of the Pennsylvania lawyers for the plan seems
overwhelming. 42 Nevertheless, dissents are to be found both in
Philadelphia and in the counties. In Philadelphia, some lawyers
complain they must have eight or nine cases referred to them be-
fore they fulfill their three required hearings. This is due to the
number of settlements after referral to a board, but before the hear-
ing. Some attorneys who have acted as chairmen have found the
burden of contacting the parties and arranging the time and place
for hearing outweigh the usefulness of the plan.
4 3
In the counties there is a feeling that lawyers should sit on
panels outside their own counties in order "to remove personalities
from arbitration. '44 The counterargument to this view is that the
plan is the responsibility of the local bar associations. They must
exercise discipline over their members and settle administrative
problems. This could not be done if the lawyers were from another
bar association.
4 5
38 Institute of Judicial Administration, Compulsory Arbitration ond Court Congestion, 6 (1959).
39 Ibid.
40 Za Letter of Nov. 4, 1959. Mr. Zal reports that initially 2,500 lawyers of the Philadelphia
Bar Association volunteered to serve, but now firms are withdrawing some of their members from
the arbitrators' list. Ibid.
41 Institute of Judicial Administration, Compulsory Arbitration and Court Congestion, 11 (1959).
42 Zah: Letter of Nov. 4, 1959; Alessandroni: Letter of Nov. 6, 1959.
43 Zah; Letter of Nov. 4, 1959.
44 Institute of Judicial Administration, Compulsory Arbitration and Court Congestion, 12 (1959).
45 Alessandroni: Letter of Nov. 6, 1959.
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The requirement for repayment of the arbitrators' fees is still
being attacked, particularly where the amount in controversy is
small. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that full reim-
bursement will not necessarily protect a party with a small claim,
for if he wins before a panel, the other party may appeal. This
could force a compromise of the award.
4 6
Each of the foregoing criticisms is concerned with the me-
chanics of the plan. None attacks its underlying theory. If another
jurisdiction considers the plan, it must first decide that compulsory
arbitration will solve its own particular judicial problems. If the
plan will, the jurisdiction must then determine that it is willng to
forego a jury trial in the first instance in exchange for trial by law-
yer panel. No jurisdiction other than Pennsylvania has yet made
this decision.47
46 Ibid.
4T A plan similar to that adopted in Pennsylvania was introduced in the Ohio legislature in 1958,
but failed to pass. Ohio H.B. 601 (1958).
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RELEASE OF ONE JOINT TORT-FEASOR IS A
RELEASE OF ALL-COVENANT NOT TO SUE
CONSTRUED TO HAVE SAME EFFECT AS RELEASE
Plaintiffs brought an action for fraud and deceit in connection
with the sale of stock for $2500 to two of the defendants and work
performed by plaintiff for defendant company. When the matter
was at issue in the trial court, defendant Howell, in consideration
of $1500.00, entered into a covenant not to sue with plaintiffs where-
by the covenant could be pleaded as a defense in any further suit
on the matter. The covenant expressly reserved the plaintiffs' right
to sue the other defendants. Howell then filed a stipulation to dis-
miss without prejudice. The other defendants presented the cov-
enant to the court who permitted them to amend their answer,
move for summary judgment, and granted the motion. On appeal,
the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. Held: The release of
one joint tort-feasor is a release of all. The same is true of a cov-
enant not to sue which goes beyond the agreement not to sue to the
point where it has the effect of a release. Price v. Baker, 12 Colo.
Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 157 (1959).
Historically the rule that the release of one joint tort-feasor is
a release of all harks back to the indivisibility of the wrong. The
rule originated in property 'law, thence to contract law, and, as an
already accepted concept, it was made a part of tort law.1 In tort
law the inseparability-of-the-injury concept has been broadened to
the extent of including joint, concurrent, or successive torts.2 In
order to abate the harshness of the release rule whereby the un-
wary plaintiff lost all rights when he entered into a partial settle-
ment with one or more of the defendants, the courts early recog-
nized the covenant not to sue which was an agreement for a con-
sideration between the plaintiff and one or more defendants to not
sue those defendants. 3 The covenant not to sue was not a defense
to suit by the plaintiff, but if the plaintiff after covenanting sued
the defendant the latter could in turn sue the plaintiff for breach of
covenant.
4
The plaintiff has the right to sue one or all joint-tortfeasors for
the injury. It is the plaintiff's choice as to whom he will sue, and
it is assumed that he will sue for total damages sustained. Thus, if
the plaintiff chooses to release one or more joint tort-feasors who
are each legally liable for the whole damage, the law holds that he
who pays for the injury has paid for all and there is nothing left
for which the other tort-feasor can be liable. Even if the release
contains a reservation of the right to sue the remaining tort-feasors,
it is held that the plaintiff no longer has a right to reserve and the
reservation clause is void.5
The traditional viewpoint, upheld by the majority opinion in
the instant case, i.e. that the release of one joint tort-feasor releases
1 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (1943).
2 Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956).
3 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (1943).
4 Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wash.2d 310, 111 P.2d 1003 (1941).
5 Roper v. Florida Public Utilities Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938).
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all, has several advantages, viz. (1) the rule is certain and unequi-
vocal, (2) it has been upheld by the Colorado courts, 6 and (3) a
covenant not to sue if properly drawn is allowed. 7 Oftentimes the
contract is ambiguous, and there is confusion as to whether it is a
release or a covenant not to sue. The distinction is technical, and,
according to the traditional viewpoint, adheres to the party's exact
wording rather than to his intention.8 The courts have held that the
determination of whether or not the contract is a release or a cov-
enant not to sue is a question of law for the courts to decide.9 It is a
jury question as to any wrongful obtaining of the release which if
found would negate the release and allow a continuance of the
cause of action.' 0 It is also a jury question as to whether or not the
plaintiff has received accord and satisfaction from the released tort-
feasor that would preclude the plaintiff's suit of the other tort-
feasors.11
The majority opinion states that several cases relied upon by
the plaintiff herein are in jurisdictions where contribution among
joint tort-feasors is allowed.' 2 It is contended that since contribu-
tion is not allowed in Colorado, these cases are not persuasive here.
Other jurisdictions who rule as Colorado on contribution have held
that allowing a compromise settlement between one or more of the
joint tort-feasors and the plaintiff is no bar to a cause of action
against the other tort-feasors. 1 The only party to be benefitted by
the majority ruling is the tort-feasor who refuses to compromise
with the injured party. The covenant not to sue can have real
meaning only if it effectively enables any party willing to compro-
mise to avoid litigation and alleviates the plaintiff's fear of a partial
settlement being held as full satisfaction.
14
The modern viewpoint, voiced by the dissenting opinion, advo-
cates examining the contract in the light of the party's intention
and the compensation that he receives. The party's intention should
govern the interpretation of the contract. If the party intended to
reserve a right to sue the other tort-feasors, the cause of action is not
extinguished by the release of one or more tort-feasors. Legal hair-
splitting required to obtain the exact intrepretation of the contract
is avoided, and a release is construed as a covenant not to sue if
there is a reservation of right against the other tort-feasor. 5 The
plaintiff cannot receive compensation for his injury more than one
time, and the amount contributed by the compromising party, if not
understood as a full satisfaction to the plaintiff, is credited to the
6 Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956).
7 Walling v. Warren, 2 Colo. 434 (1874).
8 Roper v. Florida Public Utilities Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938).
9 Gillette Motor Transport Co. v. Whitfield, 186 S.W.2d 90, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Richardson v.
Pacific Power & Light Co., I1 Wash.2d 288, 118 P.2d 985, (1941).
10 Roper v. Florida Public Utilities Co., 131 Fla. 109, 179 So. 904 (1938).
11 Matheson v. O'Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 97 N.E. 638, (1912).
12 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (1943); Louisille Gas & Electric v. Beaucond, 188 Ky. 725, 224
S.W. 179 (1920); Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958); Judson v. People's Bank and Trust
Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
13 Grondquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954).
14 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (1943).
15 Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 444, 66 N.E. 133 (1903); Grondquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d
159 (1954).
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other tort-feasor.16 In a recent case the tort-feasor had the burden
of proving that a general release without an express reservation of
right to sue other tort-feasors was a discharge of all tort-feasors.7
The traditional rule, which represents a diminishing minority
viewpoint, was revoked in an American equity court in 182218 and
in an English court in 1892.19 It has also been repudiated by legal
scholars who describe it as a relic of common law procedure.2 0 Dean
Prosser recommends that the plaintiff's cause of action should sur-
vive until he intentionally releases it or receives full compensa-
tion.21 The Restatement provides that a reservation of the right to
sue other tort-feasors in a release agreement be construed as a cov-
enant not to sue.
22
Progress, logic, and fair play stand with the modern viewpoint
as against consistency and certainty with the traditional rule. The
author believes that departui e from ancient technicalities will bring
necessary relief to such cases as 'he instant one. Tennessee, Wash-
ington, and Florida are the only remaining jurisdictions which sup-
port the majority opinion's ruling. It is time for Colorado to join
the modern view and overthrow its archaic rule.
Joyce Cocovinis
16 Louisville Gas & Electric v. Beaucond, 188 Ky. 725, 224 S.W. 179 (1920).
1T Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958).
18 Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 444, 66 N.E. 133 (1903).
19 Duck v. Mayer, 2 Q.B. 511 (C.A. 1892).
20 4 Corbin, Contracts, If 931-35 (1951); Prosser, Torts, § 46 (2d ed. 1955).
21 Prosser, supra note 20.
22 Restatement, Torts, 1 885 (1939).
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OPINION NO. 11
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO BAR
ASSOCIATION
ADOPTED JANUARY 11, 1960
1. A person admitted to the Bar of this State may not disclose,
nor permit others to disclose, the fact that he is a lawyer, if
the manner of such disclosure would be in violation of Canon
27, if done by a practicing lawyer, and if such person is
engaged in a business or occupation which, if performed by a
lawyer, would constitute, at least in part, the practice of law.
2. A lawyer engaged in the occupation of selling life insurance
may not give legal advice to his customers or clients.
3. A lawyer associated with an insurance corporation may not
give legal advice on behalf of the corporation to its customers
or clients.
FACTS
John Doe is a life insurance agent or salesman associated with
the X Life Insurance Co. He is also a lawyer licensed to practice
in the State of Colorado, but his livelihood is derived through the
sale of life insurance. He uses various means to advertise and pro-
mote his insurance business, among which are the following:




2. The mailing and distribution of a folder prepared by X Insur-
ance Co. containing Mr. Doe's picture and the following bio-
graphical data:
Mr. Doe received his LL.B. from ------------------------ Law
School in ---------------- He is a member of the ----------------
and --------------- Bars. He has appeared frequently as
a lecturer and has written various law review
articles.
3. The use of stationery and envelopes upon which appears Mr.
Doe's name, followed by "L.L.B."
4. Participation in newspaper advertisements of the X Insurance
Co. in which appears Mr. Doe's name, followed by "LL.B."
5. The mailing of letters to potential buyers of life insurance, a
sample of which is the following:
"D ear -------------------------------- :
Recent changes made in the tax laws now give
the opportunity to doctors alone to obtain a tax-
free retirement income, in some cases as high as
$18,000.00 a year.
Just mail the enclosed card to receive complete





6. The mailing of a monthly four-page circular, prepared by the
X Insurance Co., digesting recent cases in the field of tax, wills
and estates, and trust law, and containing suggestions and ad-
dressees, and signed by "John Doe, LL.B."
OPINION
The Committee is of the opinion that Mr. Doe is in violation
of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
A difficult aspect of this case is the fact that Mr. Doe is not
practicing law in the sense of earning his living therefrom. He is
an insurance salesman who is using his legal education, degree and
license as an aid to, and in promotion of, his insurance business. If
he were a practicing lawyer, or if he prepared any legal instruments
for a fee in connection with his.insurance business, his advertising
and promotional activities enumerated above would constitute a
clear violation of Canon 27. Assuming that this is not the case, we
must resolve the more perplexing problem of how far a lawyer not
engaged in active practice may go in using his legal degree and
license to promote another business.
The Committee is of the opinion that a person admitted to the
Bar of this State may not disclose, nor permit others to disclose,
the fact that he is a lawyer, if the manner of such disclosure would
be in violation of Canon 27, if done by a practicing lawyer, and if
such person is engaged in a business or occupation which, if per-
formed by a lawyer, would constitute, at least in part, the practice
of law.
This conclusion by the Committee would preclude Mr. Doe from
using the initials "LL.B." after his name in each of the six instances
set out in the facts above.
We believe that the facts show that Mr. Doe's activities would
in some measure constitute the practice of law. While the selling of
life insurance is not the practice of law per se, Mr. Doe purports to
offer a so-called "estate planning" service and to give advice as to
the federal tax laws and other laws affecting the ownership, trans-
fer, and devolution of property. This advice, if given by a lawyer,
would be the practice of law.
We are not unmindful of the fact that the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics are generally regarded as applying to the legal
profession as such and are meant to provide a standard of conduct
among lawyers which will merit the respect and confidence of the
Best Wishes to the Bar Association
NEWTON OPTICAL COMPANY
GUILD OPTICIANS
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profession, the courts and the public. We, nevertheless, feel that a
person licensed to practice law, but engaged in another occupation,
subjects himself to the Canons of Professional Ethics when he holds
himself out as a lawyer in connection with such other occupation.
It may be argued that, in any event, the prohibition against
advertising contained in Canon 27 does not apply to Mr. Doe since
the Canon refers to professional employment, meaning employment
as a lawyer, and Mr. Doe is not seeking such employment. Neverthe-
less, the only purpose which the disclosure that Mr. Doe is an
attorney would serve would be to convey the impression to potential
buyers of insurance that Mr. Doe is educated and qualified to advise
with regard to legal and tax problems which might arise in the
planning of an estate. Certainly the fact that Mr. Doe is a lawyer
has nothing to do with his business as an insurance salesman, if in
fact he does nothing other than sell insurance. If, on the other hand,
he uses his legal knowledge as an aid in selling insurance, and at the
same time holds himself out to the public as a lawyer, he subjects
himself to the provisions of the Canons. We hold that the activities
of Mr. Doe constitute the soliciting of professional employment
within the meaning of Canon 27.
But we are not confined to Canon 27 as a basis for this opinion.
If Mr. Doe is giving legal advice to customers or clients in connec-
tion with his association with the X Life Insurance Co., he is in
violation of Canon 35, which provides that the professional services
of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency.
A corporation may not practice law. Neither may an attorney prac-
tice law through or on behalf of a corporation which intervenes
between him and his client. If the employees of a corporation are
engaged in the activity of giving legal advice to third parties on
behalf of the corporation, such constitutes the corporate practice of
law and is prohibited.
If the X Life Insurance Co. is practicing law, Mr. Doe is also in
violation of Canon 47, which prohibits a lawyer from permitting his
professional services, or his name, to be used in aid of, or to make
possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency, per-
sonal or corporate.
OPINION NO. 12
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION ADOPTED MARCH 26, 1960
Syllabus
A lawyer who is retained by a lending institution to render a
title opinion on property on which the institution is making a loan
may not sell, or acquiesce in the sale of, a copy of such opinion to
the customer of the institution.
Facts
A lawyer represents a lending institution. For that client he
renders a title opinion with respect to property on which the in-
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stitution is making a loan. The client (the lending institution)
makes a charge to its customer on the settlement sheet for the title
opinion addressed to the lending institution. At the closing, and
with the knowledge of the lawyer, the customer is offered a copy
of that title opinion, for an additional charge. Is the lawyer in vio-
lation of the Canons of Professional Ethics?
Opinion
In the opinion of the Committee, the lawyer violated Canons 6,
27, and 35 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
The lawyer, through his acquiescence in the sale of the title
opinion to the customer of the lending institution, has caused the
customer to believe he has purchased a title opinion upon which he
can rely for his own purposes. Further, this arrangement may well
discourage the customer from retaining his own counsel. It is the
opinion of the Committee that an attorney-client relationship was
established, in fact, between the lawyer and the customer of the
lending institution by the furnishing of the opinion to the customer.
The attorney-client relationship was created through the solici-
tation of the lending institution, which was a violation of Canon 27.
Canon 27 prohibits the solicitation of professional employment by
a lawyer. It is equally unprofessional for a lawyer to permit such
solicitation to be made on his behalf by a third party.
Canon 6 forbids a lawyer from representing conflicting inter-
ests, except in those situations where a full disclosure of the facts
is made to the parties concerned. It can only be assumed that a
complete disclosure of the conditions upon which the lawyer was
retained by the lending institution and the limited scope and pur-
pose of the title opinion was not personally made by the lawyer to
the customer of the lending institution. The failure to disclose con-
stituted a violation of Canon 6.
It is also assumed that all discussions with the customer relat-
ing to the copy of the title opinion to be sold were conducted solely
by the lending institution. The action of the lawyer in permitting
the lending institution to act in that matter on his behalf was a
breach of Canon 35. That Canon, entitled "Intermediaries", pro-
vides in part as follows:
A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are in-
dividual. He should avoid all relations which direct the
performance of his duties by or in the interest of such in-
termediaries. A lawyer's relation to his client should be
attorneys who want service
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personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the
client.
The Committee is also of the opinion that the same canons
would be violated should the lawyer permit the lending institution
to advise its customer that the fee to be charged the customer on
the settlement sheet would automatically entitle the customer to a
copy of the lawyer's title opinion. The lawyer may not circumvent
the prohibitions of the Canons of Professional Ethics by making an
arrangement with the lending institution to charge one fee that
would be passed on in its entirety to the customer of the lending
institution and entitle the customer to a copy of the title opinion.
The disposition of the fee charged by the lending institution of
its customer is not stated in the fact situation presented. If all or
any part of the fee was retained by the lending institution with the
knowledge and consent of the lawyer, it is the opinion of the Com-
mittee that the lawyer would also be in violation of Canon 34. Can-
on 34, entitled "Division of Fees", states an absolute prohibition
against a division of fees with a lay agency.
OPINION NO. 13
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION ADOPTED MARCH 26, 1960
Syllabus
It is improper for a municipal judge and a city attorney to
share law office space to engage in private law practice in the same
suite of offices.
Facts
Both the municipal judge and the city attorney are permitted
to engage in the private practice of law, and are office associates.
However, they do not share professional fees or their salaries from
the municipality, and each maintains his own separate practice and
individual books and records.
Opinion
This practice violates Canons 13, 17, and 31 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, and Canons 3 and 15 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics. It is improper for a municipal judge and a city attorney to
share law office space to engage in private law practice in the same
suite of offices. This relationship should be severed and separate
offices established.
The arrangement is obviously fraught with peril. The danger
is twofold: first, the inference that by reason of this extra-judicial
relationship, the city attorney might enjoy unwarranted status in
the eyes of the Court for economic reasons; secondly, the inference
that, consciously or unconsciously, some legal point urged by the
city attorney might assume extra weight on grounds informally
voiced by the city attorney outside Court, and thus not be open to
argument by defense counsel at the trial with both sides present.
DICTA
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Your Committee is drawing upon the spirit of several Canons
of Ethics-both judicial and professional.
Canon 13 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states: "A judge ....
should not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any per-
son can improperly influence him...."
And Canon 31, "Private Law Practice," recites:
In many states the practice of law by one holding judicial
position is forbidden.... In inferior courts in some states
it is permitted because the county or municipality is not
able to pay adequate living compensation for a competent
judge. In such cases one who practices law is in a position
of great delicacy and must be scrupulously careful to avoid
conduct in his practice whereby he utilizes or seems to
utilize his judicial position to further his professional suc-
cess....
Finally, Canon 17, "Ex Parte Communication" (particularly in
the light of Canon 3 below) provides:
A judge should not permit private interviews, arguments
or communications designed to influence his judicial ac-
tion where interests to be affected thereby are not repre-
sented before him, except in cases where provision is made
by law for ex parte application ...
In Opinion 104, the American Bar Association Committee held
that an attorney who occupied law offices with a police magistrate,
although not in actual partnership with him, should not accept em-
ployment by persons accused of crime who were arraigned before
his office associate, either while the case was pending before the
police magistrate or thereafter, stating unequivocally: "Lawyers
should not conduct themselves in such a way as to impair the con-
fidence which the community has in the administration of justice."
Surely, the converse situation would involve like reasoning as to
the lawyer for the prosecution.
And that same committee, in its Opinion 16, held that it was
clearly unethical for one member of a law firm to act as defense
counsel and another to serve as county prosecutor, because this
would require one member of the firm to oppose the interests of the
state while the other member represented those interests, categoriz-
ing those positions as "inherently antagonistic" irrespective of Can-






Looking to the reciprocal principles in the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, Canon 3, "Attempts to Exert Personal Influence on
the Court," among other matters, provides:
. . . A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately
with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause, and he
deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or at-
tempt to gain from a judge special consideration or favor....
And Canon 15 states in part: ". . . . No fear of judicial disfavor
... should restrain him (the lawyer) from the full discharge of his
duty ... "
It would require almost superhuman conduct for the two per-
sons involved in this factual situation to refrain from conscious or
unconscious reference to matters before the municipal court, where
professional quarters outside the Court are so intimately shared.
Furthermore, the financial entanglements of sharing overhead ex-
penses in the law offices are apt to interfere with the attitude each
must assume toward the other when one becomes the advocate and
prosecutor for the municipality and the other sits as municipal
judge, a task requiring impartiality and objectivity.
In view of the foregoing, we feel that the existing arrangement,
if not an open invitation to imporpriety, cannot help but seem sus-
pect to the bar and the community and render the task of the muni-
cipal judge most difficult. The extra-judicial relationship ought to
be severed.
OPINION NO. 14
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION ADOPTED MARCH 26, 1960
Syllabus
It is improper for an attorney who is also a city councilman to
appear in behalf of defendants who are prosecuted for violation of
city ordinances in the municipal court of that city.
Facts
An attorney is a member of a city council. The city council
hires the municipal judge and fixes his salary. The attorney, while
serving on the city council, continues to practice in the municipal
court on behalf of defendants who are charged with violations of
city ordinances.
Opinion
In the opinion of the Committee, this practice is improper. Can-
on 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics reads, in part, as follows:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests,
except by express consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this
canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which
duty to another client requires him to oppose.
DICTA
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The Committee also relies upon the spirit of Canon 3 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, the heading of which is "Attempts to
Exert Personal Influence on the Court."
The attorney in this fact situation, as a councilman, is one of
those who have the authority to select the municipal judge before
whom he practices. The temptation to exert influence on the judge
through control of his tenure and salary, should the judge render
decisions unfavorable to the attorney, seems obvious. The judge in
this position might reasonably feel that influence is being exerted
through this medium of council control even though such influence
is not, in fact, exerted. Even if this possibility never occurred to
either the attorney-councilman or the municipal judge, members of
the community might conclude that improper influence was exert-
ed upon the judge.
Moreover, the attorney must be mindful of appearances of im-
proper conduct which might reasonably cause members of the com-
munity to conclude that persons charged with violation of city or-
dinances might find it to their advantage to retain an attorney-
councilman to appear on their behalf.
The situation in the statement of facts above must also be dis-
turbing in its implications to the municipal judge who is placed in
his office by the city council. Canon 13 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics states, in part, that "a judge . . . should not suffer his con-
duct to justify the impression that any person can improperly in-
fluence him or unduly enjoy his favor .......
As stated in Opinion No. 13, the Committee feels that this sit-
uation cannot help but seem suspect to the Bar and the community
and thus have an adverse effect on the administration of justice and
the public's approbation of it.
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